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ESTABLISHING A DEPRIVATION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PERSONAL SECURITY
UNDER SECTION 1983: THE USE OF UNJUSTIFIED
FORCE BY STATE OFFICIALS IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
Kathryn R. Urbonya*
When individuals acting under color of state law physically injure
a person, they may have committed what courts call an "ordinary"
tort, recognized under state law, a constitutional tort, actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 or both. 2 In struggling to discern the differences
between these two torts, 3 courts have stated vague standards of
liability: they have examined claims to determine whether state officials crossed the "constitutional line" and committed a constitutional
*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University. B.A., Beloit College, 1971; M.A.,
University of North Dakota, 1980; J.D., University of North Dakota, 1983; former law clerk
for U.S. District Court Judge G. Ernest Tidwell, Atlanta, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme
Court Judge Gerald W. Vande Walle. The author wishes to acknowledge the support received
from Georgia State University through its research grant and the editorial assistance provided
by Professor Marcia O'Kelley and Dan Gresham, a third-year law student at Georgia State
University.
1 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 states that "[e]very person
who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the
deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured." The United States Supreme Court has characterized claims brought under section
1983 as personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-68 (1985) (state statute of
limitation for personal injury actions is applicable to claims under section 1983). Section 1983
addresses constitutional violations by individuals acting under color of state law. Even though
the statute does not apply to unconstitutional actions taken under color of federal law, a plaintiff
may nevertheless establish a cause of action against these actors. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1496-1504 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986).
3 One court found that the task of distinguishing the ordinary tort from the constitutional
tort is similar to the difficult task of defining negligence; both tasks involve concepts that
"necessarily must be expressed in general, non-precise terms." Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d
1130, 1134 (3d Cir. 1983). See generally Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049, 1051 (1984)
(denying certiorari) (White, J., dissenting) (courts lack "definitive guidelines for determining
when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort"); Kidd v.
O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (4th Cir. 1985) (district court had erroneously declared that the
decisions by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to provide "a workable guideline"),
overruled on other grounds, Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). Professor
Monaghan has argued that to distinguish a constitutional tort from its common-law counterpart
the constitutional tort must have additional aggravating circumstances. Monaghan, State Law
Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 992-93
(1986).
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tort, 4 whether the conduct was "sufficiently egregious" 5 as to constitute
a constitutional tort, or whether the conduct constituted " 'the sort
of abuse of governmental power' that is cognizable under [section]
1983."6
Some courts have referred to these claims as "personal security
claims," 7 constitutional torts committed by using unjustified force
and causing physical injury. 8 The right to personal security arises
from various amendments: the fourteenth amendment right not to
be deprived "of life [or] liberty ... without due process of law," 9
the fourth amendment "right of the people to be secure in their
persons," 10 and the eighth amendment right to be free from "cruel
and unusual punishments." 11 These amendments protect cognate lib4 See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
Judge Friendly articulated four factors to aid courts in ascertaining this line. Id.; see also infra
notes 59-74, 186-87 and accompanying text. Since Glick, other courts have adopted these factors
to distinguish an ordinary tort from a constitutional tort. See, e.g., Meredith v. Arizona, 523
F.2d 481, 482-83 (9th Cir. 1975).
6 See, e.g., New v. City of Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City
of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1986); Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500 n.4.
6 See, e.g., Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019
(1981). Some courts also question whether the conduct "rises to the level of a constitutional
violation." See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 325 (1986); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d
650, 655-56 (lOth Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No.
87-603); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (pretrial detainee's interest to be free
from discomfort does not "rise to the level of those fundamental liberty interests" delineated
in prior cases).
7 See, e.g., Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1257-61 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds,
Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). The Supreme Court in Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), stated, "Among the historic liberties ... protected [by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment] was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief
for, unjustified intrusions on personal security." Id. at 673.
8 Courts, however, have stated that some psychiatric injuries are actionable under section
1983. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.
1987). See generally Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff had stated
a fourth amendment claim based on "extensive force," in the form of a ten-hour unlawful siege
of plaintiffs' house by police using helicopters and missiles). This Article addresses constitutional
torts arising from physical injuries inflicted by persons acting under color of state law.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution also
provides that an individual may not be "deprived of life [or] liberty ... without due process
of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. This Article examines the unlawful use of force by state officials
in section 1983 actions. Individuals claiming a violation of their fifth amendment right-rather
than their fourteenth amendment right-not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process
of law may seek relief by bringing a Bivens action. See supra note 1.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 2728 (1949), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment is applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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erty interests. 12
Plaintiffs have traditionally invoked the protection of the fourteenth
amendment by alleging a violation of substantive due process, 13 which
prohibits conduct that "shocks the conscience." 14 To determine whether
force "shocks the conscience," courts have generally considered the
four factors Judge Friendly articulated in Johnson v. Glick15 : 1) the
need for the force, 2) the relationship between the need and the
amount of force used, 3) the extent of the injury inflicted, and 4)
the officer's motives. 16 Courts have also recently considered the significance of the time at which the injury occurred: if the injury
occurred when state officials arrested the plaintiff, some courts have
found a violation of the fourth amendment, which prohibits unreasonable force 17 ; if the injury occurred when state officials imprisoned
the plaintiff after her conviction, some courts have found a violation
of the eighth amendment, which prohibits wanton and unnecessary
force 18; and if the injury occurred when state officials detained the
plaintiff before trial, some courts have found a violation of substantive
_due process. 19
The courts, however, have disagreed as to the standards for establishing personal security claims under the various amendments 20 and
have differed as to whether substantive due process is a viable ground
for recovery when a plaintiff may alternatively invoke the protection
of the fourth or eighth amendments. 21 In addition, the courts have
12 In Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on. other groun.ds, Justice v.
Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane), Judge Phillips attempted to mitigate the lower
court's confusion in interpreting cases that discussed physical injuries based on the fourth,
eighth, and fourteenth amendment. 774 F.2d at 1253-61. He stated that each plaintiff had
asserted a constitutional right "to be free from bodily harm, of physical abuse, at the hands
of government's agents." Id. at 1258. He referred to these rights as "cognate liberty interests
in 'personal security.'" Id. at 1260. He recognized that the court had used a variety of adjectives
to describe how state actors had exceeded their privilege to use force under the various
amendments. !d. Even though the court had used different adjectives in its opinions, he explained,
the asserted rights were nevertheless cognate liberty interests. Id. He stated, "Because the nature
of the state interests, hence agent privilege, differs depending upon the context, the nature of
the conduct necessarily exceeding (the) privilege may also differ in 'degree' or severity from
context to context." ld. at 1261 n.15. He therefore concluded that any guidelines given by the
court must be imprecise because analyzing personal security claims is an ad hoc process. !d.
13 See infra notes 36-75 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
16 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
16 !d. at 1033.
17 See infra notes 225-80 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 399-427 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 183-88, 225-80, 399-427 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 231-51, 405-27 and accompanying text.
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disagreed as to whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation of substantive
due process, which prohibits the abuse of power by officials, or
procedural due process, which prohibits deprivations of liberty without
procedural safeguards. 22
Several recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court have
engendered these different interpretations of personal security claims. 23
In Daniels u. Williams 24 and Davidson u. Cannon, 25 the Supreme Court
held that negligent conduct cannot cause a deprivation of procedural
or substantive due process within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 26 The Court left undecided whether gross negligence or recklessness would support a
claim for a deprivation of due process. 27 In Tennessee u. Garner, 28 the
Court afforded broad protection to persons seized with deadly force
under the fourth amendment, 29 and in Whitley· u. Albers, 30 a case
involving physical injury during a prison riot, the Court afforded
narrow protection to prisoners under the eighth amendment. 31
The purpose of this Article is to reveal the conflicting standards
that courts have used in examining personal security claims under
the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. In addition, the Article
offers a preliminary assessment of the appropriate standards for
liability. Part I of the Article considers the claims raised by plaintiffs
under substantive due process. 32 Part II considers those claims asserted
22 See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1497-1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986). In Gilmere six judges determined that state officials
had violated both the fourth amendment and substantive due process, id. at 1497-1505; three
judges determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish a fourth amendment violation and
that substantive due process merely duplicates the protection provided by the fourth amendment,
id. at 1505-11 (Tjoflat, J ., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and one judge determined
that the plaintiff alleged only a violation of procedural due process, id. at 1513 (Hill, J.,
dissenting). See also infra notes 37 & 181.
23 See infra notes 225-80, 399-427 and accompanying text.
24 474 U.S. 327 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 144-84 and accompanying
text.
26 474 U.S. 344 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 144-84 and accompanying
text.
26 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347; see also infra note 156 and accompanying text (citing view that
Court's decisions in Daniels and Davidson did not foreclose basing a deprivation of substantive
due process on negligent conduct).
27 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
28 471 U.S. 1 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 197-224 and accompanying
text.
29 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7- 20. See generally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3.04, at 132 (2d ed. 1986) (Garner "will have
considerable impact in § 1983 cases involving claims of police use of excessive force").
30 475 U.S. 312 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 347-98 and accompanying ·
text.
31 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 318-27.
32
See infra notes 36-187 and accompanying text.
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under the fourth amendment, 33 and part III discusses claims raised
under the eighth amendment. 34 Although courts have disagreed as to
the appropriate standards for evaluating personal security claims, they
have nonetheless recognized that they must balance the interests
presented in each case. In striking the balance under all three categories of personal security claims, courts have considered the first
three Glick factors-the need for the force, the relationship between
the need and the amount of force, and the extent of injury. These
factors are relevant to all personal security claims because they help
to focus a court's attention on the parties' interests. 35 Courts, however,
should also recognize that the specific amendment upon which a
plaintiff's claim is grounded can aid in ascertaining the identity and
weight of the interests at stake. The Article therefore proposes that,
in order to establish consistency in addressing personal security claims,
courts should recognize that the fundamental inquiry in all of these
claims is whether the force was unjustified.
I.

PERSONAL SECURITY CLAIMS UNDER SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS

In asserting personal security claims, certain plaintiffs have alleged
that a state actor violated their right to liberty, as protected by the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 36 The fourteenth amendment due process clause provides that "[n]o State shall
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . . " 37 In suing under the fourteenth amendment,
33

See infra notes 189-280 and accompanying text.

a. See infra notes 281-427 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 428-59 and accompanying text.
For example, see the discussion of Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973), infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In determining the scope of the protection afforded by the
phrase "due process," courts have struggled to understand whether allegations indicate 1) a
violation of due process based on a right protected by the Bill of Rights, which has been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment by the due process clause; 2) a violation of procedural
due process; or 3) a violation of substantive due process. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta,
774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986).
With respect to the first category, a court may refer to a violation of the fourth amendment,
which guards against unreasonable seizures, as a violation of "substantive due process" as
distinguished from a violation of procedural due process, which seeks to prevent deprivations
of liberty without procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 792
(9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's "substantive due
process claims, based on a violation of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures"). The Mann court's use of the expression "substantive due process" to
35

36
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plaintiffs have alleged that officials violated their right to substantive
due process, which prohibits conduct that "shocks the conscience." 38
To determine whether conduct "shocks the conscience," courts have
applied the factors set out in Johnson u. Glick. 39 Yet they have not
consistently intefJ)reted the Glick factors. 40
To understand a personal security claim alleging a violation of
substantive due process, one must first recognize the courts' attempts
to clarify the scope of an oxymoron-"substantive due process." 41
Numerous courts have expressed criticism, some stating that the
oxymoron "evades rather than expresses precise meaning," 42 while
other courts reject the use of substantive due process because it has
"no pedigree other than a trail of defunct, little-mourned, and sometimes ... pernicious doctrines." 43 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has looked to both history and semantics as tools in ascertaining the scope of personal security claims based on substantive
due process. 44
describe the first category may create confusion when trying to understand the nature of
substantive due process claims with respect to the third category. A claim in the third category
is not based on procedural inadequacies nor on a violation of the Bill of Rights; it is based on
conduct that "shocks the conscience," which may lead to a finding that the alleged conduct
nonetheless violated a person's constitutional right to liberty. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 336-40 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Burch v. Apalachee Comm. Mental Health
Serv., Inc., 804 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g granted, 812 F.2d 1339
(11th Cir. 1987); see also infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text (briefly discussing Justice
Stevens' views on the distinctions between procedural and substantive due process in his
concurrence to Daniels and Davidson). The focus of this section is on the scope of the protection
afforded by substantive due process, as distinguished from the substantive rights of the fourth
and eighth amendments.
38 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
39 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); see infra note 187 and
accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
41 See Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir.) (phrase is an "ubiquitous oxymoron"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
42 Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 71 (1986)
("substantive due process" is an oxymoron as is "all deliberate speed"); see also Johnson v.
Barker, 799 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (standards for "substantive due process violations
are somewhat hazy"); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[d]efining the exact scope of a substantive due process claim is by its nature an imprecise
task").
43 Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
44 Developed prior to the Civil War, the concept of due process originally connoted procedure.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.1, at 336 (3d ed. 1986). The
Court began to perceive substantive content in the due process clause when considering natural
rights. /d. In evaluating legislation under the due process clause, the Court questioned whether
the law violated the guarantees of the basic social compact, which afford protection to certain
natural rights. /d. This method of analysis flourished until 1937, when the Court deferred to
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A. Substantive Due Process: The Shield of Rochin and the Sword
of Glick

In 1952, the Court in Rochin v. California45 recognized substantive
due process as a shield to protect a defendant from conviction in a
criminal proceeding. 46 The defendant in Rochin had been convicted
of possessing morphine. 47 By using unusual force the government
obtained the unlawful drug from Rochin. 48 An intermediate appellate
court affirmed the conviction, even though it stated that the officers
were guilty of "assaulting, battering, torturing and falsely imprisoning"
the defendant. 49 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding
that the officers' conduct violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.5°
In determining the scope of substantive due process, the Court used
the analysis from its prior substantive due process decisions, 51 and
asked the following familiar questions: whether the conduct " 'offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with
the most heinous offenses' " 52 ; whether the asserted right is " 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people53 as to be ranked
as fundamental' " 54; and whether the right is " 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' " 55 Although the Court characterized these openlegislative judgment on economic matters, id. § 11.4, at 350-60; yet, it continued to use substantive
due process to protect an individual's civil rights, id. § 11.6, at 363.
45
342 u.s. 165 (1952)
46 !d. at 168-74.
47
!d. at 166.
46
!d. Three deputy sheriffs forcibly entered Rochin's house, saw two capsules beside his bed
on a night stand, and jumped him in an attempt to extract the capsules that he had swallowed
in response to their query, "Whose stuff is this?" !d. The sheriffs then handcuffed him and
took him to a hospital where a doctor, at the sheriffs' direction, "forced an emetic solution
through a tube into Rochin's stomach against his will." !d. The emetic caused Rochin to vomit;
the sheriffs then found the capsules in the vomit. !d.
49 !d. at 167 (citing People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (1951), rev'd,
342 u.s. 165 (1952)).
50 !d. at 174.
51 !d. at 169-71.
52 !d. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
53 For a discussion of the significance of the Court's use of the word "conscience," see infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
54
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
55
!d. at 169 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The Supreme Court
has stated that this test helps the Court to identify rights protected under substantive due
process. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986). The Supreme Court recently
used this phrase to determine whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984, with its provisions for
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ended questions as objective guides in determining the scope of
substantive due process, it summarized them with a pithy subjective
test. 56 After evaluating all the circumstances, the Court stated that
the officers' "conduct shocks the conscience."57
The Court's subjective "shocks the conscience" test provided little
guidance for interpreting future civil rights claims. 58 In 1973, Judge
preventive detention of adults under indictment, violated substantive due process. United States
v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987). The Court has also identified rights protected by
substantive due process by considering whether the asserted right is " 'deeply rooted in [our)
Nation's history and tradition.'" Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
·
The Court recognized that the process of discerning whether the conduct violated due process
was vague, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169-70; yet, it found vagueness was not a problem because
analysis of the "more specific" fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure similarly evokes sharp disagreement, id. at 170. It explained, "In dealing not with
the machinery of government but with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want
of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions."
!d. at 169. The Court, while reluctant to classify its evaluation of the facts as ad hoc, id. at
172, did acknowledge the need to balance conflicting interests, id. at 171 (in reviewing convictions,
the Court considers society's interests, which "push[) in opposite directions").
56 !d. at 169-72.
67 /d. at 172. The Court did not specify as to whose conscience it was referring, but in
explaining the scope of due process, the Court had previously stated that due process protects
those immunities that are " 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked fundamental.'" !d. at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)). The Court added that the "brutal" methods used to obtain the conviction "do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting
crime too energetically." !d. at 172.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), Justice Black stated, "[T]he 'fundamental
fairness' test is one on a par with that of shocking the conscience of the Court." 391 U.S. at
168-69 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Since Rochin, courts considering personal
security claims have referred to conduct that shocks the conscience of the court. See, e.g.,
Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 185 (6th Cir. 1985) (conduct must be "so brutal, demeaning,
and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of the court") (emphasis added), cert denied,
107 S. Ct. 1369 (1987); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980), cited with approval
in Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). Others have not
specified whose conscience by simply stating that the conduct "shocks the conscience." See,
e.g., Hendrix v. Matlock, 782 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1986).
56 The Supreme Court has not expressly rejected using substantive due process as a defense
for invalidating a criminal conviction. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986). In
Moran, state officials had conveyed false information to an attorney, who had been contacted
by the defendant's sister, effectively preventing the attorney from seeing the defendant, who
had not requested the assistance of an attorney prior to interrogation. !d. at 416-20. The Court
did not find a violation of substantive due process, but warned that police deception might
"rise to a level of a due process violation" if the facts were "more egregious." !d. at 432. The
dissent in Moran criticized the majority for having only a "troubled conscience"; it also stated
that the proper test in this case "is not the majority's simple 'shock the conscience' test," but
rather "the principle that due process requires fairness, integrity, and honor in the operation
of the criminal justice system." !d. at 466-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Kamisar, in
his analysis of Moran, stated that few cases will present facts egregious enough to support a
substantive due process violation which would cause the Court to reverse a conviction. Constitutional Law Conference, 55 U.S.L.W. 2232 (Oct. 28, 1986). He proposed that the Court would
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Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals attempted in Johnson
u. Glick59 to clarify the scope of Rochin's "shocks the conscience"
test. 60 In Glick a plaintiff sought to use his claim of substantive due
process as a sword in asserting a section 1983 personal security claim.
The plaintiff alleged that prior to and during his felony trial he had
been held in state facilities where he was injured when an official,
without provocation, struck him with his fist. 61 Judge Friendly held
that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action
under section 1983 against the guard who allegedly inflicted the
injury. 62
In identifying the specific constitutional amendment violated, Judge
Friendly focused on the separate protections afforded by the eighth
amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, the fourth
amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and
by substantive due process, which prohibits conduct that "shocks the
conscience." 63 Because Johnson, the plaintiff, had not been convicted
at the time of the alleged attack, Judge Friendly determined that the
attack was not "punishment" within the meaning of the eighth
amendment, 64 and as a consequence, the amendment was not applicable.65 Without explanation he found the fourth amendment inapfind a violation if the defendant's sister and lawyer had come to the police station and had
dashed into the interrogation room only to have the police officer knock down or beat up the
sister and shoot the attorney (even if the defendant did not hear the shots). ld.
59 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
so Id. at 1033.
61 I d. at 1029. He also alleged that the officer threatened to kill him and continued to harass
him by detaining him in a holding cell for two hours before permitting him to return to his
cell. Id. at 1030. In addition, he claimed that the official detained him another two hours before
letting him receive medical attention, and that even with pain pills he continued to have
"terrible pains in his head." Id.
62 I d. at 1033. Although the court mentioned the guard's denial of medical treatment, most
courts have applied Judge Friendly's analysis to claims of unlawful force rather than to claims
of insufficient medical care. See infra notes 185-87, 225-80, 319-45, 399-427 and accompanying
text. Three years after the Glick decision, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for
analyzing claims based on a denial of medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
63 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
64 I d. at 1032. The Supreme Court has determined that the eighth amendment applies only
to convicted individuals who challenge conduct relating to their confinement. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977); see also infra note 88 and accompanying text (describing
Supreme Court's eighth amendment analysis).
65 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032. Judge Friendly noted that the Supreme Court had upheld the
conviction of an official under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
based on a jury instruction that permitted a finding of guilty if the official had beaten the
victim " 'for the purpose of imposing illegal summary punishment upon him' as well as if the
beating was 'for the purpose of forcing him to make a confession.' " 481 F.2d at 1032 n.5
(emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 104 (1951)). In considering
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plicable as well. 66 With neither of these amendments applicable, he
stated, "[I]t would be absurd to hold that a pre-trial detainee has
less constitutional protection against acts of prison guards than one
who has been convicted." 67 He then looked to Rochin, which had
recognized substantive due process as a shield, for support in using
substantive due process as a sword.
Judge Friendly noted that the Supreme Court's "shocks the conscience" test in Rochin set a standard that needed greater definition. 68
He recognized that the Court's standard was not coextensive with
t~ common-law actions for assault and battery, 69 thus distinguishing
the ordinary tort from the constitutional tort: He found, however,
the line between the ordinary tort and the constitutional tort difficult
to define because of the prison environment, 70 an environment in
which guards must manage a large number of prisoners, who are not
by nature "the most gentle or tractable of men and women." 71 Acknowledging the difficulties faced by prison authorities, Judge Friendly
accepted that some force may be permissible even if in retrospect
the force was "unnecessary." 72
Judge Friendly set forth the following factors to aid in defining
unlawful force claims, one commentator, however, has argued that an attack occurring before
trial constitutes punishment. Note, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1390 (1986). He maintained that the use of force prior to trial is a failure
of proper procedures because officials inflicting harm are able to " 'skip[] the trial on the way
to punishment.'" Id. (quoting Gumz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1405 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled on other grounds,
Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987)). Most courts, however, have viewed
these claims as alleging a violation of a substantive right. See, e.g., infra notes 137-40 and
accompanying text. Courts have also rejected the view that an attack can constitute punishment.
See infra note 296 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently distinguished substantive
and procedural due process claims in determining whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was
unconstitutional. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101-04 (1987). The Court stated:
So-called "substantive due process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience," or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.''
When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive
due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has
traditionally been referred to as "procedural" due process.
Id. at 2101 (citations omitted).
66 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
67 Id. at 1032.
66 !d. at 1033. The language the Court used in Rochin could provide some insight into
interpreting the Court's "shocks the conscience" test: in that case the conduct was "brutal,"
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952); the conduct "offend[ed] even hardened sensibilities," id. at 172; and the conduct did more than "offend some fastidious squeamishness or
private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically," id.
69 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
70 !d.
71 I d.
72 I d.
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the type of force necessary to give rise to a constitutional tort based
on substantive due process:
[1)] the need for the application of force, [2)] the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used, [3)) the
extent of injury inflicted, and [4)] whether force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 73
After considering these factors, Judge Friendly found that Johnson
had alleged sufficient facts to support a substantive due process claim
against the guard. 74
The difficult task of determining what constitutes actionable conduct under Rochin's "shocks the conscience" test has caused courts
to apply the Glick factors to substantive due process claims. 75 Since
the Rochin and Glick decisions, courts have disagreed, however, not
only as to how to apply Rochin's "shocks the conscience" test and
the Glick factors, but also as to how to distinguish substantive due
process and procedural due process claims.
B.

Distinguishing Substantive Due Process from Procedural Due
Process

Several decisions by the United States Supreme Court have engendered confusion in interpreting the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 76 In Ingraham v. Wright, 77 the Court recognized that the spanking of school children may "implicate" their
liberty interests, but does not necessarily cause a "deprivation" without due process. 78 In Parratt v. Taylor, 79 the Court stated that negligent
73

7
•

/d.

I d. He did not, however, explain how he derived these factors. I d. One judge dissented,
raising arguments commonly made in section 1983 litigation. Id. at 1034-35 (Moore, J., dissenting). The dissent worried that the decision to permit an action based on an alleged isolated
incident of misconduct, rather than a pattern of misconduct, would overburden the federal
courts and would cause unnecessary monitoring of state institutions. Id. at 1035.
Although Judge Friendly did not discuss federalism, he nevertheless argued that logic dictated
that the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee's liberty at least to the extent that the
eighth amendment protects a prisoner's liberty. ld. at 1032. He noted, however, that what
constitutes "brutality" may change depending on the circumstances. ld. at 1033. He said that
the principle underlying the invalidation of Rochin's conviction should support finding substantive
due process as a sword in a section 1983 action, even though "the notion of what constitutes
brutality may not necessarily be the same." ld.
75
See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 86-187 and accompanying text.
77
430 u.s. 651 (1977).
78 ld. at 672; see infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
79 451 u.s. 527 (1981).
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conduct could constitute a "deprivation,"80 but that the availability
of adequate state remedies nevertheless satisfied the requirement of
"due process." 81 Finally, in Davidson v. Cannon82 and Daniels v.
Williams, 83 the Court overruled in part its decision in Parratt by
holding that negligent conduct could not constitute a "deprivation"
of either procedural or substantive due process. 84 Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether personal security claims
may be based on violations of both substantive and procedural due
process, most courts have determined that personal security claims
generally do not involve procedural due process issues because personal
security claims challenge the conduct of officials, not a state's procedures.85
1. Interpreting Procedural Due Process Claims
In Ingraham v. Wright;86 junior high school students alleged that
their teachers had infringed their liberty interests by subjecting them
to exceptionally harsh paddling as a means of maintaining discipline. 87
They asserted violations of the eighth amendment, 88 procedural due
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474
327 (1986).
81 /d. at 544-45; see infra notes 106-43, 181 and accompanying text.
82 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
83 474 u.s. 327 (1986).
84 /d. at 330-31; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347; see infra notes 144-78 and accompanying text.
86 See infra note 137-40.
86 430 u.s. 651 (1977).
87 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977).
88 /d. at 663-71. In addressing the eighth amendment claim, the Court considered the commonlaw rule on corporal punishment, the country's current practice, and the history of the eighth
amendment, which was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. /d. at 664. In addition,
the Court focused on the difference between the punishment of children and the punishment
of prisoners. /d. at 669-71. The Court found that children did not need the protections of the
eighth amendment because the openness of the public schools, the community's control of the
schools, and the availability of civil and criminal remedies are all "significant safeguards" against
improper punishment. /d. at 670. The Court therefore held that the eighth amendment was
not applicable to the punishment of students. /d. at 664. The Court declared that the eighth
amendment is applicable to a personal security claim based on improper punishment if the
alleged conduct occurred after the state has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law. Prior to this formal adjudication, due process is applicable. /d. at 67172 n.40. Justice White, however, rejected the Court's analysis of the eighth amendment, arguing
that public view of corporal punishment does not make it less offensive. /d. at 690 (White, J.,
dissenting). He also stated that the eighth amendment does more than guard against "cruel
and unusual punishment" because the Court had previously recognized that indifference to the
serious medical needs of inmates can constitute a violation of the eighth amendment. /d. at
688 n.4 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). In addition, he noted that in Estelle v.
80

u.s.
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process,89 and substantive due process. 90 The Supreme Court did not
address their substantive due process claim because it did not grant
certiorari as to that issue.9t
In examining the students' procedural due process claim, the Court
Gamble the Court held that the availability of a state remedy, which would have allowed the
prisoner to sue for medical malpractice, was not determinative of whether there was an eighth
amendment violation. !d. at 690-91. The Court left open the question whether the eighth
amendment applies to punishments analogous to criminal punishments, such as involuntary
confinements in mental or juvenile institutions. /d. at 669 n.37. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982), the Court stated, however, that a person involuntarily committed to a mental
institution could not allege a violation of personal security under the eighth amendment. 457
U.S. at 325. The Court held that the proper basis for seeking recovery was substantive due
process, which requires the Court to balance the liberty interests of an individual and the state's
interests in restraint. !d. at 320-21. The Court recognized that even a criminal conviction and
incarceration cannot destroy an individual's right to be free from arbitrary bodily restraint. !d.
at 316. The Court labeled this interest as the "core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause." !d. The Court concluded that this liberty interest requires the state to "provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint."
!d. at 319.
89 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653.
90 !d. at 659 n.12.
91 /d. at 679 n.47 (left open whether there is "an independent federal cause of action to
vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause"). Justice White in dissent stated
that because the Court left open this issue, the majority opinion subtly advises attorneys how
to draft complaints. !d. at 689 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). Although the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ingraham refused "to look at each individual instance of [corporal] punishment to
determine if it [had] been administered arbitrarily or capriciously," Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976), alf'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), other courts have found that the
paddling of students may constitute a violation of substantive due process. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 654-56 (lOth Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 87-603); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611-13 (4th Cir. 1980). Two years
after the Court's decision in Ingraham, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of
conditions for pretrial detainees under substantive due process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535-44 (1979). The Court stated that the conditions would be unconstitutional if they constituted
punishment. /d. at 535. The Court explained that pretrial detainees could successfully challenge
the conditions if they directly proved an intent to punish or indirectly proved an intent to
punish by demonstrating that the regulation was purposeless or arbitrary. The Court set forth
the following test for determining a violation of substantive due process:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or
whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. . . . [l]f a
particular condition or restriction of . . . detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if
a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or
purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon [inmates].
!d. at 538-39; see also Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1983) (difficult to distinguish
punishment from permissible restrictions arising from detention), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984). Since the Court's decision in Bell, the Court has applied the same test to reject other
substantive due process challenges by pretrial detainees. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct.
2095, 2100-04 (1987) (held federal statute authorizing preventive detention was facially valid);
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 577-91 (1984) (upheld denial of contact visits and secret
searches of cells).
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stated that the historic right to personal security92 encompasses the
right to be free from bodily restraint and punishment. 93 The Court
found that the students' liberty interests were "implicated"94 by the
paddling because the action constituted punishment; 95 but the Court
conditioned the students' recovery under a procedural due process
theory on a finding that any available state common-law remedies
would be inadequate to redress the students' injuries.96 Although the
Court stated that the issue before it was the adequacy of the available
state remedy, it only briefly discussed the state remedy. 97
The Court instead focused on the issue whether notice and a hearing
were necessary prior to the paddling, even though the plaintiffs had
a state remedy. 98 To resolve this latter issue, the Court used the
balancing test it established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 99 which requires
courts to weigh three factors: 1) the individual's interests, 2) the risk
of erroneously depriving the individual of her interests and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and 3) the burdens
imposed upon the state if the safeguards were required. 100
With respect to the first Mathews factor, the Court found that
students have "a strong interest in [having] procedural safeguards
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment." 101 In examining the
second and third factors of the Mathews test, the probable value of
requiring process prior to punishment and the burden of that process
on the state, the Court found that an advance hearing would only
92 The right to personal security constitutes one of the fundamental rights recognized by
Blackstone. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134; see Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 115 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (Blackstone classified fundamental rights under
three divisions: "the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of
private property"). In Ingraham, the Court noted that although the scope of this historic liberty
has "not been defined precisely," it was certain that the interest protects an individual's right
to be free from "bodily restraint and punishment" unless the state affords due process. 430
U.S. at 673-74.
93 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672-74.
94 The Court distinguished between two actions, one that "implicates" a liberty interest and
one that causes only a "de minimus level of imposition." Id. at 674. The latter classification
is perhaps the test preceding the courts' current standardless test: "Does the action rise to the
level of a constitutional violation." See supra note 6.
95 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674.
96 Id. at 674-75. In a footnote the Court clarified that the case did not involve any statecreated interest in liberty or property. Id. at 674 n.43.
97
Id. at 676-78. The Court discussed the state remedy in evaluating the factors of Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. The Court
described the state remedy as a safeguard against erroneous deprivation of liberty. Ingraham,
430 U.S. at 676-78.
98 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674-676, 678-82.
99 424 u.s. 319 (1976).
100 I d. at 335.
101 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676.
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marginally reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, 102 while resulting
in a "significant intrusion" into the domain of education. 103 Because
requiring a hearing before a paddling could cause numerous problems,
the Court determined that the students' strong interest in having a
hearing prior to punishment did not outweigh the costs of the hearing. 104
The Court therefore held that even though the paddling implicated
the students' liberty interests, a hearing was not necessary prior to
punishment, because the available common -law remedies could afford
the students due process. 1o5
In Parratt v. Taylor 106 a plurality of the Court stated that its
analysis of an alleged deprivation of property without due process
was consistent with the Court's analysis in lngraham. 107 In Parratt
a prisoner alleged that prison officials had negligently failed to give
I d. at 682.
I d. The Court stated that requiring a hearing before paddling could cause teachers to forego
using corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, id. at 680-81, could cause students to suffer
unnecessary prolonged anxiety about the possibility of forthcoming punishment, id. at 681 n.51,
and could generally undermine the educational process, id. at 680-81.
104 I d. at 682.
10 5 Id. Justice White disagreed, arguing that the remedy was inadequate. Id. at 693-95 (White,
J., dissenting). He noted that the students could not recover under state law if the teachers
had acted in good faith and that, more important, a postdeprivation remedy could not make
them whole. Id. at 694-95 (White, J., dissenting). He declared, "The infliction of physical pain
is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 695 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that postdeprivation remedies may not fully compensate a person who has suffered unlawful physical restraint or punishment, in contrast to
some one who has suffered a deprivation of property. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
commenting on the nature of the interest, both Justices White and Stevens raised arguments
that the lower courts have used in determining whether Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-31 (1986), is applicable to an alleged
personal security claim. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. In rejecting the Court's
analysis that the availability of common-law remedies afforded due process to the students,
Justice White contrasted the need for predeprivation procedures under the fourth amendment
with the need for predeprivation procedures under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 697-700 (White, J., dissenting). He stated that the fourth
amendment requires courts to balance the individual's interests and the public's interests and
that this balancing defines the "'process that is due.'" Id. at 698 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975)). Warrantless arrests are permissible, he
explained, because the balancing process indicates that police officers could not otherwise perform
their duties. Id. at 697-99. If police officers violate the fourth amendment, their victims may
seek to suppress the evidence that was unlawfully seized or seek a civil remedy. Justice White
argued that the balancing process built into the fourth amendment is not applicable to students
subject to corporal punishment; he contended that if the Court were to correctly balance the
factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the balance would tip in favor
of providing notice and informal hearings for students prior to punishment. Id. at 697-700
(White, J., dissenting).
106 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-31 (1986).
107 Id. at 542. The Court stated that the facts in Ingraham were "arguably" "more egregious"
than the facts in Parratt because Ingraham involved intentional conduct and a deprivation of
liberty. Id.
102

103
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him mail-ordered hobby materials, which had arrived while he was
in segregation. 108 Unlike the students in Ingraham, the prisoner did
not challenge the lack of notice and a hearing prior to his loss; he
simply sought to recover the value of the hobby materials. 109
Addressing the question whether the prisoner had suffered a constitutional violation, the plurality stated that the officials had allegedly
acted under color of law, 110 that the hobby kit fell within the definition
of property,m and that the negligent act amounted to a "deprivation."112 Even though the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of
property, the Court stated that a constitutional violation exists only
when the deprivation was without due process of law. 113 In resolving
the due process issue, the plurality considered the adequacy of the
state tort remedies. 11"
The plurality recognized that determining a procedural due process
violation requires balancing. 115 It did not balance the factors mentioned
in Mathews v. Eldridge, as the Court did in Ingraham, because it
was not addressing whether notice and a hearing were necessary prior
to the deprivation. 116 The plurality instead questioned whether pre/d. at 529-30.
/d. at 529.
110 /d. at 535.
108

109

ld. at 529 n.1 (prison officials did not dispute that the prisoner had a property interest).
ld. at 536-37.
118 ld. at 537 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)).
114 ld. at 537-44. The plurality also considered the issue of whether section 1983 contains a
state-of-mind requirement. ld. at 534-35. It determined that the statute does not require an
individual to act with a certain state-of-mind. ld. Since Parratt the Supreme Court has stated
that certain amendments, which a plaintiff would use as the basis for an action, might require
the state actor to have acted with a particular state-of-mind. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 334 (1986). In examining the statute, the plurality in Parratt relied on the Court's
analysis of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the Court contrasted the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 242, which is the criminal counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with the language
of section 1983. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534-35. For a discussion of Monroe v. Pape, see infra note
141. Because section 242 requires the alleged unlawful conduct to have been done willfully and
section 1983 (formerly referred to as section 1979) does not contain this adverb, the Court in
Monroe stated that section 1983 did not require willful conduct. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. The
plurality in Parratt therefore concluded that the statute does not require a person to act with
a particular state-of-mind for the conduct to be actionable under section 1983. Parratt, 451
U.S. at 535. One commentator has argued that the state-of-mind or degree of culpability is
irrelevant to establishing a prima facie case when a plaintiff brings a section 1983 action. Mead,
Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional
Tort be Saved from Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 4 (1986) ("section 1983 is a strict
liability species of tort and the Supreme Court should explicitly classify it as such to ensure
the continued evolution of the constitutional tort species").
115 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538-40.
116 Courts have used the factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in three areas:
to determine whether a hearing is necessary prior to a government action that would deprive
an individual of a property or liberty interest, to determine what procedures are necessary at
111

112
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deprivation process was feasible. 117 The plurality explained that even
though due process requires a hearing at some time before a state
finally deprives a person of property, 118 a predeprivation hearing may
sometimes not be practicable because of a need to act quickly 119 or
because the alleged act was random and unauthorized. 120 In considering
the deprivation involved in Parratt, the plurality determined that a
predeprivation hearing was not practicable because the actions of the
prison officials were random and unauthorized. 121 Under these circumstances, the plurality stated, a state may still afford due process
to the person who suffered a deprivation if the state provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy.l22
After finding that a predeprivation hearing was not possible, the
plurality then considered the adequacy of the state remedy. 123 It noted
that state law could afford an adequate remedy, even if it were not
identical to the remedies available under section 1983. 124
a hearing, and to determine the standard of proof that the government must meet to deprive
an individual of a property or liberty interest. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 44, § 13.8, at 490-92 (and cases cited therein). The Mathews v. Eldridge factors,
however, do not allow a person to "accurately predict" the result in a case "unless one knows
the personal value systems of those doing the balancing." Id. § 13.8, at 490. In addition, the
factors do not require courts to find a system for identifying due process values. ld. (citing
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews
v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976)).
117 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-44. Professor Bandes has interpreted Parratt as creating an
"impracticability exception" to Mathews. Bandes, "Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson":
Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L. REV. 101,
134 (1986). She stated, "If Mathews requires the government to provide predeprivation process
and predeprivation process is impracticable, it may instead provide postdeprivation process."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
8
11 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540.
119 ld. at 538-39. To support the proposition that a predeprivation hearing is not always
necessary, the Court referred to a state's need to prevent harm to the public by destroying
tainted food and drugs and by seizing the assets of a bank to prevent mismanagement. ld.
Although the Court in Ingraham did not explicitly state that teachers must be able to use
corporal punishment quickly if they are to use it effectively, underlying the Court's balancing
is a belief that corporal punishment works only if teachers use it without hesitation, subject
to the knowledge of common-law actions for improper discipline. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
120 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
121 Jd.
122 /d. at 543-44.
123 /d. at 543-44.
124 /d. The plurality did not use the Mathews v. Eldridge test to determine the adequacy of
the state remedy. It found the remedy adequate even though state law did not provide for a
jury trial and punitive damages and would permit an action against the state, not against the
individual employees. Id. Since Parratt, courts have been uncertain in determining what constitutes an adequate state remedy. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1238
(7th Cir. 1984); Note, Parratt v. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement,
65 B.U.L. REV. 607, 616-649 (1985) (author proposes that state immunity signifies that the
state remedy is inadequate).
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The plurality's analysis engendered one opm10n concuning and
dissenting and three opinions concurring. Justice Marshall concurred
and dissented in part, agreeing with the plurality's decision to consider
the availability of state remedies, but disputing the plurality's finding
that the remedy was adequate. 125 Justice Stewart argued that the
prisoner was not deprived of his property within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment and, in the alternative, even if he had been
deprived of his property, the state remedies satisfied due process. 126
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, sought to narrow the
plurality's holding by rejecting procedural due process as a basis for
a personal security claim. He maintained that the plurality's reasoning
would not apply to deprivations of life or liberty interests, nor to
substantive due process claims. 127 He also contended that if a state
could institute procedures to direct intentional actions, then the
availability of a postdeprivation remedy would be irrelevant. 128
Justice Powell's concurrence, however, rejected the prisoner's claim,
arguing that negligent conduct could not constitute a deprivation of
property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 129 To
support this contention, Justice Powell relied on a narrow definition
of the word "deprivation"; the purpose of section 1983, which was
"to deter real abuses by state officials"; and the need to "avoid
trivializing the right of action provided in section 1983."130 He contended that the word " 'deprivation' connotes an intentional act . . .
or, at the very least, a deliberate decision not to act." 131 He added
that negligent conduct could not constitute a deprivation of substantive due process, a claim not considered by the Court. 132
Since the division of the Supreme Court in Parratt, the Court has
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 554-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., concurring).
12 7 Id. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

125
126

ld. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), all of the justices agreed that Parratt is
also applicable to random, unauthorized, intentional conduct that causes a deprivation of property.
468 U.S. at 533. The Court declared that the key issue is whether the State is in a position
to provide for predeprivation process. Id. at 532. The Court stated:
The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized
intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct. Arguably,
intentional acts are even more difficult to anticipate because one bent on intentionally
depriving a person of his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his
·
intent.
Id. at 533.
129 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 546-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
130 I d. at 546-54.
131 !d. at 548 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(2d ed. 1945)).
132
I d. at 552-53.
126
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applied the Parratt analysis to random, unauthorized, and intentional
deprivations of property, 133 but has excluded its application to property
deprivations carried out pursuant to an established state procedure. 134
Because the Court in Parratt and its progeny discussed property
interests, lower courts have been uncertain as to how to harmonize
Parratt and Ingraham, which discussed liberty interests. 136 Some courts
have applied the Court's analysis in Parratt to violations of liberty;
they interpret Parratt to require them to consider whether the alleged
conduct was random and unauthorized, and they interpret Ingraham
to require them to consider whether the state remedy is adequate. 136
A majority of lower federal courts, however, have held that Parratt
is not applicable to liberty interests 137 protected by the fourth amendHudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-34 (1984). In Hudson the Court held that a prison
official's intentional destruction of an inmate's property during a shakedown search did not
violate the fourteenth amendment. /d. at 536. The Court considered the same issues it discussed
in Parratt; it found that the state could not predict intentional conduct and that the state
remedy was adequate. /d. at 533-35.
1:w Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-38 (1982). In Logan Justice Blackmun
held that an aggrieved employee had a property interest arising from the state's procedural act,
which afforded employees with an adjudicatory process. /d. at 431-33. When the state employment
commission failed to convene a fact-finding hearing, it foreclosed the employee from invoking
the adjudicatory process. /d. at 426-27. Justice Blackmun held that established state procedures
had destroyed the employee's property interest. /d. at 436. He found the case distinguishable
from Parratt. /d. He stated, "Unlike the complainant in Parratt, [the employee] is challenging
not the Commission's error, but the 'established state procedure' that destroys his entitlement
without according him proper procedural safeguards." /d.
136 See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 334-39 (5th Cir. 1984); Daniels v. Williams,
748 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1984), atf'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Gilmere v. City
of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 905-10 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated on this ground, 774 F.2d 1495, 14971500 (1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d
1395, 1409 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986),
overruled on other grounds, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
McGowan v. Riley, 628 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (deprivation of life). One
commentator has argued that not only is Parratt applicable to liberty interests, but also that
the courts should not use substantive due process as a means to avoid applying Parratt to
liberty claims. Comment, Due Process: Applications of the Parratt Doctrine to Random and
Unauthorized Deprivations of Life and Liberty, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 887, 891-902 (1984).
137 See, e.g., Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1497-1502 (and cases cited therein). See generally Moore,
Parratt, Liberty, and the Devolution of Due Process: A Time for Reflection, 13 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 201, 253-59 (1985) (counselling against the application of Parratt to the deprivation of
liberty interests). In Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals explained that Parratt is applicable to only some procedural due process claims:
Parratt v. Taylor is not a magic wand that can make any section 1983 action resembling a
tort suit disappear into thin air. Parratt applies only when the plaintiff alleges a deprivation
of procedural due process; it is irrelevant when the plaintiff has alleged a violation of some
substantive constitutional proscription. Further, in the context of procedural due process,
Parratt applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct is such that the provision
of predeprivation procedural safeguards is impracticable or infeasible.
740 F.2d at 329. See generally Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1987) (and cases
133
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ment, 1as the eighth amendment, 139 and substantive due process. 140 Even
though the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the applicability of
Parratt to personal security claims, 141 in its recent companion decisions
in Daniels v. Williams 142 and Davidson v. Cannon 143 the Court nevercited therein) (Parratt not applicable to "[i]ntentional, substantive violations of constitutional
rights"); Bandes, supra note 117, at 120-21 n.142 (Parratt is not applicable to unlawful force
claim based on one of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
138 See, e.g., Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986); Gilmere, 774 F.2d at
1501-02; Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 872 (7th Cir. 1983). See generally Mcintosh v.
Arkansas Repub. Party, 816 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir.) (Parratt not applicable to fourth amendment
"false arrest" claim), vacated, 825 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1987).
139 See, e.g., McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986).
140 See, e.g., Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City of
Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986); Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1499-1502; Gumz, 772 F.2d
at 1399-1400 n.3; Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 823 (3d Cir. 1984), atf'd on other grounds
sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). One commentator has argued that plaintiffs
should allege violations of substantive due process to avoid the application of Parratt. Shapiro,
Keeping Civil Rights Actions against State Officials in Federal Court: Avoiding the Reach of
Parratt v. Taylor and Hudson v. Palmer, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 161, 170-71 (1985). Professor
Nahmod has noted, however, that most courts have not explained why Parratt is not applicable
to substantive due process claims. Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34
U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 236 (1985).
141 Although the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Parratt two decades after its decision
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1967), the Monroe decision supports the proposition that
Parratt is not applicable to personal security claims. In Monroe plaintiffs alleged that thirteen
city police officers without warrants had broken into their home early in the morning and
forced them to stand naked in one room while they went from room to room, emptying drawers
and ripping mattress covers. 365 U.S. at 169. One plaintiff also alleged that he was unlawfully
detained for ten hours at the police station. /d. These alleged actions constituted a violation
of the fourth amendment and of state law. /d. The Supreme Court held that Congress in
enacting section 1983 intended to afford a federal remedy to parties deprived of their constitutional
rights as a result of an official's misuse of state power. /d. at 172. Even though the alleged
actions also violated state law, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have to bring their
action in state court. /d. at 183. The Court stated, "The federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked." /d.
The Court also stated that section 1983 (formerly section 1979) had three purposes: to override
unlawful state laws; to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy was inadequate; and
"to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice." /d. at 173-74. The Court explained that an official's unauthorized conduct
is actionable under section 1983 because the state gives that official the power to act. /d. at
172. In determining that unauthorized conduct was actionable under section 1983, the Court
did not consider whether the plaintiffs, who had suffered an intentional and unauthorized
deprivation by state officials, had an adequate remedy under state law. The Monroe decision
therefore would not support applying Parratt to fourth amendment claims, even though the
Court in Parratt found controlling that state law afforded an adequate remedy based on an
alleged deprivation of due process resulting from random and unauthorized conduct. Since the
Court's decision in Monroe, most courts have also afforded plaintiffs a federal forum for their
personal security claims based on conduct that violated the eighth amendment and substantive
due process. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
14 2 474 u.s. 327 (1986).
143 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
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theless provided some guidance in analyzing both procedural and
substantive due process claims.

2. Interpreting Substantive Due Process Claims
In Daniels v. Williams, 144 the plaintiff, an inmate in a city jail,
allegedly sustained back and ankle injuries when he fell on a jail
stairway. 145 He alleged that a correctional deputy had negligently left
a pillow on the stairway, which caused him to slip and fall. 146
Davidson v. Cannon, 147 on the other hand, was a case evading the
classic negligence characterization. While Davidson was an inmate in
a state prison, he was attacked and injured by another inmate. 148
Two days before the attack occurred, Davidson had alerted prison
officials to the possibility he would be assaulted, but the officials
failed to follow the normal procedures to avert the altercation. 149
In considering the facts of these two cases, all of the justices agreed
that Daniels' action was based on negligence, 150 but disagreed as to
whether Davidson's action was based on negligence or recklessness. 151
Although the Court in Daniels reaffirmed that section 1983 does not
contain a state-of-mind requirement/52 it held that negligent conduct
cannot constitute a deprivation of due process. 153 Yet, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, left open the questions whether gross
474 u.s. 327 (1986).
I d. at 328.
146 !d.
147 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
148 !d. at 346. As a result of the attack, Davidson broke his nose and injured his head, neck,
and shoulder. !d.
149 !d. When the assistant superintendent of the prison read Davidson's note about the
possibility of a fight, the superintendent did not separate the antagonistic inmates, nor did he
place Davidson in custody, or talk to the inmates about the gravity of the threat. !d. at 351
(Biackmun, J., dissenting). Instead he passed the note to a corrections officer, who did not read
the note after being informed of the threat. !d. at 345. The corrections officer failed to follow
the normal procedure of interviewing the complainants, nor did he report the threat to the
weekend shift when he left work. !d. at 351 (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
150 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36. Justice Stevens, however, found that determining the stateof-mind of the jail official was not necessary. !d. at 341; see infra notes 172-77 and accompanying
text.
151 In Davidson, the majority opinion stated that the issue before the Court was only the
state's alleged negligent conduct because the prisoner did not appeal the district court's finding
that the state officials did not act with deliberate or callous indifference. Davidson, 474 U.S.
at 347; see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
152 474 U.S. at 329-30; see also supra note 114.
153 474 U.S. at 330-36.
144

145
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negligence 154 or recklessness could constitute a deprivation. 155 The
Court in Davidson, however, interpreted Daniels as holding that
negligent conduct cannot violate either procedural due process or
substantive due process.I5s
In Daniels, the Court overruled that portion of Parratt which held
that negligent conduct could constitute a deprivation. 157 It noted,
however, that negligent conduct may violate other constitutional provisions.158 Justice Rehnquist sought to support his narrow definition
of "deprivation" by considering the history of the due process clause. 159
He stated, "Historically, [the] guarantee of due process has been
applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property." 160 He noted that history indicates
that the due process clause protects individuals from the "arbitrary
exerCise" of governmental powers. 161 He added that if there is " 'no
affirmative abuse of power'" by a state actor, a plaintiff should not
have a federal forum.1s2
154

The Eighth Circuit, however, has interpreted Daniels as holding that gross negligence is
not actionable under the fourteenth amendment, even though the Supreme Court left this issue
open. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1468-69 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 97
(1987).
165 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
168 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348. In Daniels, Justice Rehnquist mentioned that the due process
clause not only requires procedural fairness, but also guards against oppressive conduct. 474
U.S. at 331 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 277 (1856) (discussing due process under the fifth amendment)). One commentator has
argued, however, that because Daniels did not address substantive due process the Court has
not determined that negligent conduct cannot constitute a deprivation of substantive due process.
Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. § 1983-The Actionability of a Negligent Deprivation of a
Liberty Interest in Light of Daniels and Davidson, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 599, 633-34 (1986). The
author contends that negligent conduct can constitute a deprivation of substantive due process.
Id. at 629 n.158.
157 474 U.S. at 329-31. In overruling Parratt, Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Parratt. ld. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 547-49 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 527 (1986)). For a brief discussion
of Justice Powell's concurrence, see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
168 474 U.S. at 334.
159 I d. at 331.
160 Id. (citations omitted).
161 I d.
162
I d. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring),
overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). The Court's use of the phrase
"affirmative abuse of power" will not be problematic when courts examine claims dealing with
unlawful force allegedly inflicted by officials because they have necessarily affirmatively used
their power. The phrase, however, is more problematic in examining allegations that officials
failed to act, as exemplified by the Court's analysis in Davidson. See supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text. Some courts have held that the due process clause guards against "negative"
liberty deprivations, based on the right to be let alone, and not "positive" liberty deprivations,
based on the right to receive protective services. See, e.g., Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510
(7th Cir.) (Bill of Rights is "a charter of negative liberties" (citing Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d
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The majority determined that because Daniels involved only negligence, the state's conduct did not constitute a deprivation. 163 The
Court therefore rejected the inmate's claim that the state deprived
him of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. 164
By adhering to its narrow definition of "deprivation," a majority
of the Court in Davidson rejected Davidson's claims, which were based
on the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 165 The Court stated that
because Davidson had failed to appeal the district court's finding that
the officials did not act with deliberate or callous indifference, the
only issue before the Court was Davidson's claim that the defendants
were negligent.l66 Because the majority viewed the case as involving
only negligence, it found Daniels controlling and therefore held that
the state had not deprived Davidson of a liberty interest. 167
Justice Blackmun, joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, agreed
that as a general rule negligence does not constitute a deprivation,
but contended that under some circumstances negligence is actionable. 168 In the alternative, Justice Blackmun stated that if the defendants acted recklessly, Davidson would have a claim under the
due process clause. 169 He maintained that protection available under
the due process clause is broader than the protection available under
the eighth amendment. 170 He argued that because recklessness or
616 (7th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 597 (1986); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
163 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31.
164 /d. at 332-33.
165 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 346.
166 /d. at 347.
167 /d. at 347-48. Even though Justice Brennan agreed with the Court in Daniels and Davidson
that negligent conduct cannot cause a deprivation, he dissented in Davidson because he disagreed
with the Court's interpretation of the record. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated
that the Court should remand the case to the court of appeals, which should review the district
court's finding that the defendants were not reckless or callously indifferent to Davidson's needs.
/d.
/d. at 353-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He explained that because the state prohibited
prisoners from striking back when assaulted, the prisoners had to depend upon the guards for
their security. ld. at 354-55. Under the circumstances of this case, he found that the state's
conduct deprived Davidson of his liberty interest. ld. at 352-53.
169 I d. at 356-58.
170 /d. at 358 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Whether prisoners may assert claims under both the
eighth and fourteenth amendments is unclear. In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the
Court held that the protection available under the two amendments is identical when a prisoner,
who incurred physical injury during the quelling of a prison riot, asserts violations of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. 475 U.S. at 327. The breadth of the Court's holding is unclear
because of its language. The Court stated:
Because this case involves prison inmates rather than pretrial detainees or persons enjoying
unrestricted liberty we imply nothing as to the proper answer to that question outside the
prison security context by holding . . . that in these circumstances the Due Process Clause
168
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deliberate indifference is actionable under the eighth amendment,
then recklessness should be actionable under the due process clause. 171
Justice Stevens, in contrast to the other eight members of the
Court, refused to consider a defendant's state-of-mind in interpreting
the word "deprivation." 172 He stated in his concurrence to Daniels
and Davidson that "deprive" signifies that a person has incurred a
loss. 173 To reject the procedural due process claims raised in both
Daniels and Davidson, Justice Stevens argued that the Court did not
need to redefine the meaning of "deprive." 174 Justice Stevens maintained that the due process clause does not prohibit the state from
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, but rather it prohibits
only deprivations that are without due process of law. 175 To determine
whether a deprivation is without due process of law, Justice Stevens
contended that the Court should examine the adequacy of the state
remedy. 176 He stated that "fundamental fairness," a totality of the
circumstances inquiry, is the test for determining the adequacy of a
state remedy. 177 In addition, he stated that the issue of fair procedures
is irrelevant when plaintiffs assert claims based on substantive due
process and those rights specified in the Bill of Rights that have
been incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. 178
The various opinions in Davidson and Daniels raise and leave
affords [the prisoner) no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.
ld. (emphasis added). The Court specifically left open the question of the protection available
under substantive due process to pretrial detainees and citizens at large. If the Court's phrase
"in the prison security context" refers to the specific facts of the case-a prison riot-then
pretrial detainees and prisoners may have broader protection under substantive due process
than under the eighth amendment. If the phrase refers to the state's general interest in
maintaining discipline in the jails, then pretrial detainees and prisoners may have identical
protection under substantive due process and the eighth amendment. See generally Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979) ("[t]here is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees
pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates. . . . [in) certain circumstances [detainees)
present a greater risk to jail security and order"); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)
(same); see also infra note 282 and accompanying text.
171 Davidson, 474 U.S. at 356-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also argued
that the prisoner had suffered a deprivation of liberty without due process because the available
state remedy would be inadequate. I d. at 358-60. The state remedy would have afforded immunity
to the state defendants. ld. at 358.
172 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173 /d.
174 Id. at 340-41.
175 /d .. at 338-40.
176 /d. at 341.
177 Jd. In contrast to Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens found that a state system, which
gives defendants the shield of immunity, may nevertheless be fundamentally fair. Id. at 34243.
178 /d. at 339-40.
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unanswered many questions about the scope of due process. By
defining "deprivation" to exclude negligent conduct as a basis for
asserting either a violation of substantive due process or procedural
due process, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the applicability
of Parratt to liberty interests. Consequently, the Court did not offer
guidance to lower courts who have disagreed as to the reach of Parratt's
reasoning. 179
Justice Stevens in Daniels and Davidson, however, addressed the
question of Parratt's applicability, stating that Parratt and the cases
under consideration raised claims based on procedural, not substantive
due process. 180 He explained that a person asserting a procedural due
process claim contends that the state's procedures fail to provide due
process and that a person asserting a substantive due process claim
contends that the state's conduct was unconstitutional the moment
it occurred, regardless of the availability of postdeprivation procedures.181
·
Justice Stevens' focus on the differences between procedural and
substantive claims is harmonious with the Court's prior decision in
Ingraham v. Wright. 182 In Ingraham, the Court's analysis indicates
See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 /d. at 342. In discussing procedural and substantive due process claims, one court has
stated that sometimes "procedural due process shades into substantive due process." Thibodeaux
v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 338 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984). Justice Stevens discussion of procedural
and substantive due process, however, provides the proper framework for analysis. Some facts
may raise both procedural and substantive due process issues. In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137 (1979), a person who had been detained in jail three days pursuant to a valid warrant
alleged that a sheriff had negligently failed to establish identification procedures that would
have revealed that he was not the person sought by the police. 443 U.S. at 139. Even though
the inmate had alleged mere negligence, the Court did not dismiss the case on that ground;
instead it determined that the facts failed to indicate a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law because due process does not require officials to take "every conceivable step"
to avoid convicting an innocent person. !d. at 145. The Court explained, however, that if officials
failed to respond to an inmate's repeated protests of mistaken identification "after the lapse of
a certain amount of time," then the inmate would suffer a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. !d. In his concurrence Justice Blackmun stated that failure to act under those
circumstances would constitute a violation of substantive due process. !d. at 148 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). In Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655-56 (lOth Cir. 1987), petition for cert.
filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 87-603), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the paddling of students may indicate a violation of procedural due process or
substantive due process, depending on the egregiousness of the facts. The court explained:
We thus envision three categories of corporeal punishment. Punishments that do not exceed
the traditional common law standards of reasonableness are not actionable; punishments
that exceed the common law standard without adequate state remedies violate procedural
due process rights; and finally, punishments that are so grossly excessive as to be shocking
to the conscience violate substantive due process rights, without regard to the adequacy of
state remedies.
817 F.2d at 656.
182 430 u.s. 651 (1977).
179

180
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that a deprivation of liberty could establish two different claims, one
based on procedural due process and the other on substantive due
process. Parratt would therefore be applicable to claims challenging
the state's procedures and would be inapplicable to claims challenging
the state's conduct.
The decisions in Daniels and Davidson also explicitly left open the
questions of whether grossly negligent or reckless conduct could
constitute a deprivation of due process. 183 With respect to procedural
due process claims, Justice Stevens correctly perceived that the official's state-of-mind is irrelevant. 184 When confronted with substantive due process claims, the Court has articulated the "shocks the
conscience" test, which would seem to require intentional conduct,
or at the very least, reckless conduct. 185 In using the Glick factors to
interpret this test, some courts, however, have found less culpable
conduct to be actionable. 186 The lack of uniformity in applying the
Glick factors indicates the difficulty of understanding the Court's
183 In Daniels the Court recognized that its decision could engender questions as to what
constitutes gross negligence and recklessness. 474 U.S. at 334. The Court stated, however, that
other areas of the law also abound in "nice distinctions." Id.
Professors Prosser and Keeton have attempted to define the terms "gross negligence" and
"recklessness." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
31-32, at 169-85 (5th ed. 1984). Although they believe that there is no generally accepted
meaning as to what constitutes gross negligence, they explained that when a court uses the
term, it probably signifies "more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps
than conscious indifference to the consequences." ld. § 34, at 212. In defining recklessness, they
stated that courts use willful and wanton as synonyms for recklessness. These terms, they
explained, suggest that "the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character
in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences." ld. at 213. They described these terms as representing "quasi-intent." Id. at
212. In attempting to interpret the kind of conduct required by the due process clause, the
United States in its amicus curiae brief in Davidson argued that intentional conduct is necessary.
Brief for Amicus curiae at 16, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). It emphasized that
the fifth amendment due process clause contains an "equal protection component" and that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires intentional conduct. ld. It
therefore concluded that the due process clause must similarly require intentional conduct. ld.
The Sixth Circuit, prior to Davidson, held that substantive due process claims require intentional
conduct. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane). But see Nishiyama v.
Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987) (court determined that, after Wilson, gross
negligence is actionable under substantive due process). Other courts, however, have not required
intentional conduct when considering substantive due process claims. See, e.g., Fernandez v.
Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1214-16 (1st Cir. 1986) (gross negligence actionable); Coon v. Ledbetter,
780 F.2d 1158, 1163 (5th Cir. 1986) .(same).
184 But see Comment, supra note 156, at 631 (arguing that a showing of gross negligence or
recklessness is sufficient for a violation of procedural due process).
185 See, e.g., Wilson, 770 F.2d at 586 (substantive due process requires intentional conduct).
186 See, e.g., Fernandez, 784 F.2d at 1214-16 (gross negligence actionable); Coon, 780 F.2d at
1163 (same).
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"shocks the conscience" test. 187
Some courts have also been uncertain in determining the scope of
a substantive due process claim when the plaintiff's status at the
time of injury may invite the protection of another amendment. By
examining the nature of the claims asserted under the fourth and
eighth amendments, one should be better able to discern whether the
claims are duplicative of claims asserted under substantive due process.188
Although all courts have looked to Judge Friendly's decision in Glick for guidance in
examining unlawful force claims, the courts have not been consistent in examining substantive
due process claims. Many courts quote the factors mentioned in Glick. E.g., McRorie v. Shimoda,
795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (11th
Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986); Davis v. Forrest, 768 F.2d 257,
258 (8th Cir. 1985); Norris v. District of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals explained the Glick factors as follows: the officer's action caused "severe injuries, was
grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by
malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of
official power th-at shocks the conscience." Id. at 265. Some courts have also required severe
injuries and malice. E.g., Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655-56 (lOth Cir. 1987), petition for
cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 87-603); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328,
1333 (10th Cir. 1982); see also M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN. SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS.
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 3.3, at 44 (1986) (serious injury necessary). But see Robison v. Via,
821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987) ("permanent or severe" injury not necessary); Hewitt v. City
of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1379 (lOth Cir.) (factors include the "extent of the
injury"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the
Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 246-50 (1984) (rejecting extent of the injury
factor; bad motive alone is sufficient).
Other courts, however, have stated that malice is not necessary. E.g., Fernandez, 784 F.2d
at 1214; Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1384 (1987). In addition, the Seventh Circuit, in its now overruled decision in Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled on this
ground, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987), stated that the Glick factors
are requirements that a plaintiff must prove. 772 F.2d at 1400. Another court, however, has
stated that the Glick factors are only some of the factors in determining whether the force was
unlawful under the circumstances. Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
188 In examining the Daniels and Davidson opinions, one judge noted that Justice Stevens,
as he articulated the three rights protected by due process, did not mention that an act can
violate more than one provision. Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Sneed, J., concurring). Judge Sneed stated an act of assault and battery may violate three
provisions: procedural due process, substantive due process, and the eighth amendment. Id. at
799. He contended that the issue is whether the federal court is the proper forum for the
claims, not whether there is a violation. Id. at 797 n.5. He argued that the federal courts should
consider claims based only on injuries occurring as a result of an established state procedure;
he maintained that Parratt should be applicable to all other claims. Id. at 798.
If claims are duplicative, then a·plaintiff may recover only once. Fowler v. Carrollton Public
Library, 799 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[b]ecause § 1983 damages are based on a principle
of compensation, a characterization of plaintiff's loss which permits duplicative recovery for
one type of harm is not allowed"); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 101 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986)
(court did not decide the eighth amendment claim because recovery would duplicate recovery
under substantive due process). See generally Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura,
187
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PERSONAL SECURITY CLAIMS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

The first clause of the fourth amendment declares that it is "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." 189 Plaintiffs have alleged personal
security claims under the protection afforded by this amendment, but,
prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v.
Garner, 190 few courts sought to determine if the force used during an
arrest was violative of the fourth amendment. 191 After Johnson v.
Glick, 192 courts used the factors Judge Friendly articulated to decide
whether the alleged conduct violated substantive due process,1 93 regardless of whether the state official injured the plaintiff during an
arrest, during pretrial incarceration, or after a conviction. 194 The
106 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-45 (1986) (trial court improperly allowed jury to assess duplicative damages
by instructing them to consider the inherent value of a constitutional right in addition to
considering actual losses); Carter v. Rogers, 805 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1986) (only one
recovery for act forming bases of state assault and battery claim and federal excessive force
claim); Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 118-20, 133-35 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (only one
recovery for violation of fourth amendment and state false arrest claim).
' 89 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The second clause provides that probable cause is necessary to
support the issuance of an arrest or a search warrant. Id. The latter clause articulates the
general rule that a warrant is necessary prior to an arrest or a search; the first clause states
the exception to the general rule. See, e.g., C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 4.03, at 136-41 (2d ed. 1986). If an arrest or a search is not pursuant to a warrant, then the
arrest or search may be valid only if it is "reasonable." ld. When an official violates the fourth
amendment, the injured party may consider two sanctions: she may seek to invoke the exclusionary rule in her state criminal proceeding and she may consider bringing an action under
section 1983.
190 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text.
191 Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231-33 (4th Cir. 1970). In Jenkins the plaintiff and
his friends were allegedly harassing another group of boys. Id. at 1230-31. When police officers
saw them, all the boys dispersed, except for the plaintiff who was holding a tire tool which
had been thrown at him. Id. A police officer, who stated that he could not tell that the bar
was not a gun, began chasing the plaintiff. Id. When the officer ordered the plaintiff to halt,
he dropped the bar. ld. The police officer then shot him at close range. Id. The officer stated
that he accidentally shot the plaintiff in the thigh while trying to arrest him and admitted that
the shot could have hit the plaintiff in the stomach. Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the officer was reckless and wanton, and that such action was arbitrary. Id. at 1232.
The court found that the conduct violated the plaintifrs right to personal security under the
fourth amendment. Id. Although the court based its holding on the fourth amendment, its
findings that the conduct was reckless and arbitrary could also support a violation of substantive
due process. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
' 92 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
' 93 See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1123 (1986), overruled, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., id. at 1404 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). But see Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108,
1118-21 (D. Del. 1985) (fourth amendment applies to claims based on the manner of arrest;
substantive due process applies to claims based on force used when suspect is in custody).
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Garner, however, has caused courts
to examine whether the alleged conduct violated the fourth amendment.195 But Garner has not dispelled the uncertainty as to the proper
relationship between claims raised under the fourth amendment and
claims raised under substantive due process. 196

A. Balancing Interests Under the Fourth Amendment
In Tennessee v. Garner, 197 a police officer thought that Garner, an
unarmed burglary suspect, would elude capture if allowed to climb a
nearby fence; to prevent a possible escape, the officer shot Garner in
the back of the head, killing him. 198 The issue before the Court was
the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute199 that authorized officers
to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon after warning the felon of
their intention to arrest. 200 The Court held that the statute was not
facially invalid under the fourth amendment, but rather invalid as
applied to these circumstances because it appeared to authorize the
officer's "use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony
suspects, whatever the circumstances." 201
See infra notes 231-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 231-80 and accompanying text.
197 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
198 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3. The police officer was "reasonably sure" that Gamer was unarmed
while committing a burglary at night. Id. The officer ordered Garner to stop, but Garner did
not heed the command. Id. at 4.
199 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982). The statute provides that "[i]f, after notice of the
intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the
necessary means to effect the arrest." Id.
200 471 U.S. at 3.
201 ld. at 11-12. Some judges, however, have interpreted the Garner decision as one not
addressing whether the statute was constitutional, but rather whether the police officer's conduct
was a violation of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Giimere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495,
1507 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986). In Gilmere, Judge Tjoflat stated, "Since the state statute
could not cure any fourth amendment violation that might have occurred, its provisions were
irrelevant in the Court's analysis of the scope of the fourth amendment." Id.
The procedural history of Garner, however, reveals that when the Sixth Circuit had first
considered the case, it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the officer
and his superiors because of the officers' qualified immunity from liability for constitutional
claims. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52, 54 (6th Cir. 1979). The Sixth Circuit
had found that the officer had acted in good faith reliance on the Tennessee statute, which
had authorized deadly force, but remanded for a determination of the City's liability. Id. at 5455. The lower court then held that the statute was constitutional, but the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's judgment. Gamer v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 249 (6th Cir.
1983) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). The Supreme Court
in Garner thus had before it the issue of the constitutionality of the statute. 471 U.S. at 3;
195

196
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The Court first determined that the officer had seized Garner within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 202 The Court stated that officers
seize an individual whenever they "restrain the freedom of a person
to walk away." 203 The Court emphasized that even though police
officers may have probable cause to seize an individual, their seizure
may nonetheless violate the fourth amendment if the means used are
unreasonable. 204
In determining whether the seizure violated the fourth amendment,
the Court recognized "the balancing of competing interests" as the
"key principle of the fourth amendment." 205 The Court stated that
the fourth amendment requires the courts to balance an individual's
interest in being free from intrusion against the government's interests
in causing the intrusion. 206 When considering the plaintiff's interests,
the Court found that he had a fundamental interest in his life and
that both he and society had an interest in ensuring a judicial
determination of his guilt. 207 In contrast to these significant interests,
the Court found that the state had an interest in providing effective
law enforcement. 208 The Court also found that studies of police departments do not indicate that the use of deadly force inhibits flight. 209
After considering these interests, the Court stated, "It is not better
that all felony suspects die than that they escape." 210 The Court
declared that officers may use deadly force to seize a suspect only
when they believe the person "poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others." 211 Because it determined that
see also Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986). The Fernandez court stated, "The
novel issue in Garner, however, was not whether a shooting by the police was a seizure subject
to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment but whether a state statute that
authorized the use of deadly force to secure the arrest of nondangerous fleeing felons violated
that reasonableness requirement." Id. at 1217 n.3. These different interpretations of the holding
of Garner may have arisen as a result of a statement made by the dissent in Garner. Justice
O'Connor stated, "The issue is not the constitutional validity of the Tennessee statute on its
face or as applied to some hypothetical set of facts. Instead, the issue is whether the use of
deadly force by [the officer] under the circumstances of this case violated Garner's constitutional
rights." Garner, 471 U.S. at 25.
202 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
2oa Jd.
204 I d. at 7-8.
205 ld. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)).
206
I d. The Court examined the reasonableness of the means by considering the extent of the
intrusion against the need for it. Id. at 20-22. The dissent agreed that the fourth amendment
requires courts to balance "the important public interest in crime prevention and detection"
against the individual's interest. Id. at 25-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent also
recognized that balancing entails examination of the "nature and quality of the intrusion." Id.
207
Id. at 9.
208
209
210

211

I d.
Id. at 10.
I d. at 11.
Id.
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burglary did not "automatically justify the use of force," the Court
found that under the circumstances of this case the plaintiff's interests
outweighed the state's interests. 212 The officer's conduct, which the
statute authorized, was therefore unreasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. 21a
After weighing the interests involved, the Court rejected interpreting
the fourth amendment to incorporate the common-law rule that
officers may use whatever force is necessary to stop a fleeing felon. 214
The Court noted that even though almost one-half of the states had
adopted the common-law rule 215 and that there is not a "constant or
overwhelming trend away from the common-law rule," 216 the rule was
nevertheless inappropriate for modern times. 217
Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. 218 She contended that the Court had created a
constitutional right to flee for burglary suspects. 219 In her view, the
Court had improperly weighed the asserted interests220 by failing to
fully account for the damaging effects of its decision on law enforcement and public safety. 221
212
213
214
215

/d. at 21-22.
/d.
/d. at 12-15.
/d. at 15-16.

/d. at 18.
/d. at 18-20. The Court explained that the rule developed when all felonies were punishable
by death and weapons were rudimentary. /d. at 13-15. In addition, the Court commented that
some police departments have adopted procedures that are more restrictive than the commonlaw rule. /d. at 15-20. The Court also stated that because the common-law rule permitted officers
to use deadly force to capture fleeing felons but not fleeing misdemeanants, officers would have
less difficulty in the field distinguishing between individuals who are dangerous and those who
are not dangerous than they would in distinguishing between individuals committing felonies
and those committing misdemeanors. /d. at 20.
218 /d. at 22-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219 /d. at 23.
220 /d. at 25-31.
221 /d. With respect to a suspect's fundamental interest in her life, Justice O'Connor commented
that a suspect can protect this interest by heeding an officer's command to halt. /d. at 29. She
also found that the state's interest in crime prevention and detection was compelling because
burglary is a serious and dangerous felony. /d. at 26-28. She determined that under the
circumstances, the officer's decision to seize the burglary suspect was reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. /d. at 29-30. She also summarily rejected other claims based
on the sixth and eighth amendments and on substantive due process, id. at 30-31; thereby
disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit's holding that the statute violated both the fourth amendment
and substantive due process, Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 246-47 (6th Cir.
1983) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
In the alternative, she argued that even if the officer's conduct violated the fourth amendment,
she would not join the Court's opinion, because the Court failed to limit its holding to the use
of firearms by police officers. Garner, 471 U.S. at 31. She found that the Court's opinion could
prohibit any force by police officers that could be lethal. /d. With respect to weapons carried
216
217
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Even though all the Justices agreed in Garner that examining the
constitutionality of the state statute required the Court to balance
the interests of the seized individual against the interests of the state,
they failed to agree on the proper weight to accord to these interests.
They also failed to agree on the significance of the common -law rule
and the states' current practices. 222 Although the Court found the
statute unconstitutional as applied under the fourth amendment, some
courts 223 and commentators224 have found the Court's analysis indistinguishable from its analysis of substantive due process issues.

B.

The Circuits' Evaluation of Personal Security Claims Under the
Fourth Amendment and Substantive Due Process

Prior to. the Supreme Court's decision in Garner, the circuit courts
had evaluated personal security claims using the Glick factors to
determine whether the alleged conduct violated substantive due process.225 Since Garner, many courts have begun addressing personal
security claims based on an alleged violation of the fourth amendment.226 As a result, some courts have compared and contrasted claims
based on the fourth amendment with those based on substantive due
by suspects, she stated that the Court's opinion was deficient because it failed to indicate
whether weapons, such as knives, baseball bats, and rope, could support an officer's belief that
an individual was dangerous. ld. at 32. She emphasized that because officers have only a few
seconds to decide whether to use deadly force, the Court's opinion will result in courts "secondguessing" police officers and will engender many suits seeking to determine whether the particular
object posed a danger under the circumstances. ld. at 31-32.
222 Professor Aleinikoff has stated that the Court's decision in Garner demonstrates "grisly
instrumentalism" because the Court focused on whether "shooting suspects is a 'sufficiently
productive means' of furthering its law enforcement interests." Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 990-91 (1987). He criticized the Court for its poor
analysis of the fourth amendment, and contended that the Court failed to examine "the purpose,
scope or source of the protection against unreasonable seizures." ld. at 990.
223 See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
22• See, e.g., Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 686-87 (1986) (Court's analysis in Garner is similar to
its analysis of incorporation issues, which involves a normative approach); Comment, Constitutional Law-Deadly Force and the Fourth Amendment: Tennessee v. Garner, 20 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 76, 84 (1986) (Court did not examine the decedent's expectation of privacy, but instead
focussed on due process issues). See generally Comment, Criminal Law-The Right to Run:
Deadly Force and the Fleeing Felon, Tennessee v. Garner, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 171, 183 (1986)
(legislatures, not the Court, should balance public and private interests).
225 See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 231-40, 261-67 and accompanying text.
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process. 227 Some courts, however, have avoided discussing the relationship228 or have combined the reasonableness test under the fourth
amendment with the Glick factors under substantive due process. 222
Responding to the array of different positions on the issue, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals now appears ready to apply a single standard
of liability to· all personal security claims-regardless of whether the
claim is based on fourth, eighth, or fourteenth amendment rights. 230
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, held that
the use of force by police officers during an arrest violated both
substantive due process and the fourth amendment. 231 The Eleventh
Circuit examined the district court's findings that the beating during
an arrest had occurred with little or no provocation and that the
officer who shot the decedent could not have reasonably believed that
his life was in danger. 232 After considering Rochin's "shocks the
conscience" test and the Glick factors, 233 the court held that the
beating and shooting of the decedent constituted a violation of substantive due process.234
In examining the fourth amendment claim, the court referred to
the balancing test articulated in Garner. 235 The court stated that
227 See, e.g., Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 3-6 (2d Cir.), rev'd on reargument, 827
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,
1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. City of Fayetteville v. Spell, 108 S. Ct. 752
(1988); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1416-17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
311 (1987); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513, 515-17 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff stated a violation
of the fourth amendment and substantive due process by alleging that the officer had maliciously
inflicted a serious injury while arresting him without probable cause); Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d
1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184, 3185 (1987); New v. City of Minneapolis,
792 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1214-17 (1st Cir.
1986); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986); Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101, 104-05 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986). See generally Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.
Unit A 1981) (the fourth and fourteenth amendments protect the "right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity").
228 See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
230 Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane); see infra notes 271-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit position).
231 Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1499-1502. In Gilmere, the decedent, after avoiding an automobile
collision, had allegedly threatened a driver with a gun. ld. at 1496. When two police officers
arrived at the decedent's home they ordered the inebriated decedent to go to their car for
questioning. Id. at 1496-97. When the decedent refused to go and attempted to flee, the officers
began beating him, id. at 1497; and a scuffle ensued during which one of the officers' revolver
fell to the ground, id. at 1497 n.l. The decedent then lunged toward the other officer, who
reacted by fatally shooting him at close range. ld.
232 I d. at 1501.
233 /d. at 1500-01.
23• I d. at 1501.
235 /d. at 1502.
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balancing entails consideration of four factors: 1) the scope of the
particular intrusion; 2) the manner in which the officer conducts the
intrusion; 3) the justification for initiating the intrusion, and 4) the
place in which the officer conducts the intrusion. 236 The court found
that the decedent had a significant interest in bodily security, the
officers' use of force while the decedent was in custody was "only
minimally, if at all, necessary to enable them to carry out their official
duties," 237 and the location of the scuffle did not pose a threat to the
officers. 238 In addition, the court found that the decedent was not
dangerous and did not provoke the officers' use of force. 239 The court
therefore held that under the circumstances, both the beating and
the shooting of the decedent violated the fourth amendment. 240
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in contrast to the Eleventh
Circuit, recently refused to allow a plaintiff injured during her arrest
to assert both a violation of substantive due process and the fourth
amendment. 241 It held that the fourth amendment was the sole basis
for recovery. 242 In rejecting substantive due process as a basis for a
claim alleging the use of unlawful force during an arrest, the Seventh
Circuit overruled a prior decision which had applied the stringent
substantive due process standard to a claim that officials had used
excessive force to effectuate an arrest. 243 The Seventh Circuit stated
two reasons why the fourth amendment was the sole basis for plaintiff's excessive force claim. First, the court noted that the terms of
the fourth amendment are " 'specifically directed to methods of arrest
and seizure of the person.' " 244 By looking to the language of the
amendment, the court was impliedly relying on the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, expression of certain powers implies ex236 [d. The court found these factors to be relevant because the Supreme Court had articulated
them in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), as it analyzed a fourth amendment issue presented
by a prisoner. 441 U.S. at 559. In Bell a prisoner had challenged, inter alia, the prison's
requirement of a visual body-cavity inspection after each contact visit with a person from
outside the institution. Id. at 559-60. Although the Court recognized that abusive inspections
would constitute a violation, the prison's rules, which did not require probable cause for inspection,
were constitutional. Id.
237 Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1502.

[d.
[d.
240 [d.

238

239

Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
/d. at 710.
243 Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123
(1986), overruled on this ground, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-14 (7th Cir.
1987).
244 Lester, 830 F.2d at 710 (citing Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1278 n.87 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Bell's discussion of the point cites Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 243 (6th
Cir. 1983), atf'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985))).
241

242
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elusion of others.
As a second reason, the court explained that the history of substantive due process indicates that the fourth amendment-and not
the fourteenth-is the proper basis for a claim arising from an arrest. 245
The court emphasized that the fourth amendment was not applicable
to the states when the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California246
recognized substantive due process as a defense in a criminal proceeding.247 It stressed that in contexts similar to Rochin the Supreme
Court had recently relied on the fourth amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard, not substantive due process. 248 The Seventh
Circuit also rejected the assertion that substantive due process analysis, including the requisite showing of malice, entails "the same
balancing of interests the Supreme Court undertook in Garner. " 249 It
found that the two standards were incompatible because the fourth
amendment test proscribes unreasonable seizures, an objective inquiry
which is conducted "without regard to the officer's underlying intent
or motivation." 250 It is this objective reasonableness standard, the
Seventh Circuit decided, which properly balances the individual and
societal interests detailed in Garner. 251
Although some courts and judges have articulated their views concerning the relationship of substantive due process claims and fourth
amendment claims,252 other courts have been less forthright and
/d. at 710-12.
342 u.s. 165 (1952).
247 Lester, 830 F.2d at 710. Nine years after the decision in Rochin, the Supreme Court
reversed its position and applied the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Lester, 830 F.2d at 711.
246 Lester, 830 F.2d at 711 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)).
249 !d. at 712 (citing for comparison Jamieson v. Shaw, 722 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985)).
In Jamieson, the Fifth Circuit stated that its test for excessive force, a test identical to the
Seventh Circuit's test for substantive due process, was similar to the fourth amendment balancing
standard used by the Supreme Court in Garner. 722 F.2d at 1210.
250 Lester, 830 F.2d at 712.
251 !d. at 711. Although a majority of the judges on the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
decision in Lester, several judges opposed the elimination of substantive due process as an
alternative or companion basis for bringing an excessive force claim arising from an arrest. /d.
at 713 n.6. These judges argued that substantive due process analysis should be retained as an
available method of analyzing fourth amendment cases involving, e.g., the exclusionary rule or
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which may "fall within the traditional ambit of due
process." !d. The judges also asserted that the majority had foreclosed resort to substantive
due process unnecessarily, because there was no Supreme Court authority mandating a reassessment of the circuit's existing test for excessive force. !d.
252 See supra notes 231-51 and accompanying text; see also Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827
F.2d 1, 3-6 (2d Cir.), reu'd on reargument, 827 F2d 7 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
701 (1988). In Dodd v. City of Norwich, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted
the Supreme Court's decision in Garner. !d. On reargument the court determined that an officer,
245

246
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sometimes confusing. For example, when confronted with claims arising from force used during custody, the courts have used a variety
of approaches. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deliberately avoided
discussing a substantive due process claim by upholding a jury's verdict
under the fourth amendment. 253 It held that the fourth amendment
was applicable to a claim alleging that a police officer had used force
while transporting the plaintiff to the station. 264 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals examined a similar claim, but upheld the jury's
verdict finding a violation of substantive due process. 266 In this case
the plaintiff alleged that the officer had used excessive force during
and after her arrest, violating her rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 266 Although the court found a substantive due process
violation, it approved of the lower court's jury instruction, which
articulated a fourth amendment standard. 267 Adding to this mix of
approaches is a decision of a Delaware federal district court, which
after discussing the Garner decision, 268 adhered to a rigorous substantive due process standard in examining a claim based on an
officer's unlawful use of force while the plaintiff was in custody. 269
Other circuit courts have considered the Glick factors-including
the factor of malice-in examining claims ostensibly based solely on
the fourth amendment.260 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deterwho had accidently killed the decedent during an attempted arrest, had not violated the fourth
amendment because "Garner bars the deliberate use of deadly force to seize an unarmed, fleeing,
suspected felon." !d. at 7 (emphasis added). The court observed that because the decedent had
been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment by handcuffing him prior to the
shooting and because the use of force was accidental, Garner was inapplicable. !d. It explained
that negligent conduct does not violate the fourth amendment. ld. Judge Pratt, who vehemently
dissented, cogently argued that even after the decedent was seized the fourth amendment required
the officer to act reasonably. ld. at 8 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
253 Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1007-10 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).
25'ld. at 1010; But cf. Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1987) (fourth
amendment protections inapplicable to police use of roadblock), petition for cert. filed, 56 U .S.L. W.
3165 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1987) (No. 87-248).
256 Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 321-23, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1384 (1987).
256 ld. at 321-22.
257 ld. at 325. The instruction had provided that police officers may use "such force as is
necessary under the circumstances to effect a lawful arrest," id., but that they may not use
force that is "unreasonable, unnecessary, or violent," id. The court also approved the instruction
which stated that to determine liability the jury did not need to find that the officer acted
maliciously. ld.
266 Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108, 1118-19 (D. Del. 1985).
259 ld. at 1120-21. The court did not find the alleged conduct to be brutal and shocking. !d.
at 1121. The court stated that the fourth amendment is applicable to force claims based on
the manner of the arrest and substantive due process is applicable to claims based on force
used while the suspect was in custody. ld. at 1118-20.
260 In Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985), a case decided before Garner,
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mined that a plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a violation of her fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable force. 261 The plaintiff
alleged that she had been a passenger in a car and sustained severe
injuries when police officers impermissibly set up a roadblock in order
to apprehend the driver. 262 The court stated that after Garner, "it is
now settled that the Fourth Amendment limits the level of force that
may be used to accomplish a seizure of the person: the level of force
must be 'reasonable.' " 263 After determining that the officers had seized
the plaintiff within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 264 the
court noted that the fourth amendment requires courts to balance
the parties' interests. 265 Although the court had stated that the fourth
amendment forbids unreasonable seizures, it stated that the Glick
factors express "a similar test.'' 266 The court explained that the fourth
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a double amputee's claim that the officers, who
arrested him in his home, had dragged him to the police station without asking him if he
wanted a wheelchair or his prosthetic legs. 779 F.2d at 1365-66. The court did not refer to the
claim as one based on the fourth amendment or substantive due process. It labeled the plaintiffs
claim as an "excessive force claim." Id. at 1371. Although the court mentioned Glick, it stated
that a plaintiff may establish a violation of personal security if "the degree of force used was
unreasonable under the circumstances, or if the. force was used for an improper purpose." Id.
The first test, reasonableness, states a fourth amendment standard, while the second test,
improper purpose, is one of the Glick factors used in examining substantive due process claims.
Other courts, before and after Garner, have similarly combined the standards. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Andrews, 811 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir. 1987) (while not specifically relying of the Glick factors,
the Seventh Circuit holds "an officer may use only the degree of force that is reasonable under
the circumstances"); Clark v. Beville, 730 F.2d 739 (11th Cir. 1984). The Clark court did not
specify a basis for an unlawful force claim occurring during the arrest, stating that the test is
reasonableness under the circumstances, and cited as support, Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d
263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), a case using the Glick factors. Clark, 730 F.2d at 740.
261 Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209-12 (5th Cir. 1985).
262 /d. at 1207. She alleged that the officers knew that there was not a warrant outstanding
for the driver, that the driver was mentally ill, and that there were passengers in the car. Id.
263 !d. at 1209.
264 /d. at 1210. The court stated that the officers had seized the plaintiff when the officers
deliberately placed the roadblock in front of the car in which they knew she was travelling. Id.
Contra Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1987) (No. 87-248). In Brower, the Ninth Circuit held that a
roadblock did not operate as a "seizure" of the driver of the target automobile. Id. at 546-47.
The court distinguished the contrary authority in Jamieson by stating that the plaintiff in
Jamieson was an unintended victim of the roadblock. Id. at 546. For incisive criticism of the
majority's weak attempt in Brower to distinguish Jamieson and the Supreme Court decision in
Garner, see the dissent in the Brower case by Judge Pregerson. Id. at 548-51 (Pregerson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
265 Jamieson, 772 F.2d at 1210. The court quoted Garner's balancing test and it's statement
that balancing is the essence of the fourth amendment. Id. It also recognized that balancing
requires courts to examine the "totality of the circumstances." Id.
266 !d. The court paraphrased the Glick factors as follows:
In determining whether the state officer has crossed the constitutional line that would make
the physical abuse actionable under Section 1983, we must inquire into the amount of force
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amendment and the Glick test require the courts to balance "the same
competing interests."267
In another decision, the Fifth Circuit explained its post-Garner
requirements for establishing a personal security claim arising from
an arrest. 268 It stated that the force used must not only be "grossly
disproportionate under the circumstances, but also . . . so inspired
by malice as to amount to an abuse of official power that shocks the
conscience." 269 It found Garner applicable to claims asserted against
municipalities, not against individual officers. 270
In the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the standard to be applied
to a claim based exclusively on the fourth amendment is unclear. In
one case involving an arrest, 271 the circuit court identified the fourth
amendment as an independent source of protection against excessive
force, 272 and applied a "reasonableness" test modeled on the standard
developed by the Supreme Court in Tennessee u. Garner. 273 The
reasoning of this .decision was subsequently rejected by the circuit,
sitting en bane, in a case involving infliction of force during custody. 274
used in relationship to the need presented, the extent of the injury inflicted and the motives
of the state officer. If the state officer's action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather
than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official
power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983.
/d.
267 /d. at 1210 n.7. In Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1023-24 (D. Mass. 1985), a
district court in Massachusetts came to the same conclusion. It found the Glick factors applicable
to a fourth amendment personal security claim because the latter requires the court to consider
the totality of the circumstances. 621 F. Supp. at 1024. In addition, he found that the Glick
factors distinguish constitutional violations from ordinary torts. Id.
268 Hendrix v. Matlock, 782 F.2d 1273, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1986).
269 /d. at 1275.
210 I d.
271 Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled in part, Justice v. Dennis, 834
F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). In Kidd the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action alleging
that certain members of the Fairfax, Virginia police force " 'brutally' and 'severely' beat, kicked,
and maced him while he was handcuffed" during the course of an attempted arrest. Id. at 1253.
272 /d. at 1254-55 (Garner makes clear that the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement
applies to the method by which seizures are to be made).
273
/d. at 1256-57 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). The ·Fourth Circuit stated
that the terms "inhumane," "malicious," "sadistic," and "shocking to the conscience," which
had been used in its prior fourth amendment tests, are not standards for establishing liability,
but rather are descriptions of force that exceed an officer's privilege to use force in various
contexts. /d. at 1261 & n.15. The court stated, "Because the nature of the state interests, hence
agent privilege, differs depending upon the context, the nature of conduct necessarily exceeding
privilege may also differ in 'degree' or severity from context to context." ld. at 1261 n.15.
274 Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). In Justice, the plaintiff, who
had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, was taken before a magistrate and
then escorted to a booking area by the arresting officers. /d. at 381. Throughout the process
the plaintiff verbally abused the police and engaged in "active physical resistance," until during
the booking, when the plaintiff was maced by one of the officers. /d.

1987]

Personal Security Claims

211

Although the claim might have been treated as one arising from an
arrest, 276 the Fourth Circuit treated the claim as falling under the
fifth amendment. 276 This distinction mattered little, however, because
the court went on to identify the four factors of substantive due
process as "basic principles" in all personal security claims. 277 Thus,
although acknowledging distinctions between claims arising from the
separate amendments, the court nevertheless chose to establish a
standard which in effect imposes a state-of-mind requirement on
fourth amendment claims, a result at odds with the objective reasonableness standard used by the Supreme Court in Garner. 278
The Fourth Circuit's decision is confusing because it fails to indicate
whether the circuit now holds the substantive due process analysis
· to be the functional equivalent of the balancing test in Garner, as
the Fifth Circuit has decided, 279 or whether the circuit agrees with
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that there exists a separate objective fourth amendment standard to be applied but only under the
proper conditions. 280 The Fourth Circuit's vacillation is symptomatic
of the difficult task of reconciling the separate interests embodied in
the fourth amendment and the principles of substantive due process,
a difficulty no less pronounced in the judicial attempts to set the
proper relationship between substantive due process and the eighth
amendment.
276 See id. at 388. (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips, author of the court's prior opinion
in Kidd and the dissent in Justice, argued that the fourth amendment covers more than just
the "initial point" of taking custody over the person. Id. He argued that the fourth amendment
remains a source of protection throughout the time the party arrested is in the custody of the
arresting officer. Id. (citing Robins v. Harum, 773 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (fourth
amendment covers use of excessive force while transporting arrested party to police station);
Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (agreeing with Robins, and
applying fourth amendment to use of excessive force while arrested party in the custody of
arresting officers at the police station)).
276 /d. at 383 n.4.
277 /d. at 383. This application of the substantive due process factors to the fourth amendment
setting had precedent from a panel decision of the circuit three months prior to the decision
in Justice. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987). In Graham, the court
applied a formulation of the substantive due process test, including the factor of malice, to a
personal security claim arising from the use of force during an investigatory stop. /d. at 948
(citing the test used in King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1980)). Curiously,
however, the majority opinion in Justice fails to mention the earlier decision in Graham.
278 See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
280 Of course, the question of whether an objective standard is proper for fourth amendment
claims is separate from the question of whether a section 1983 plaintiff should be allowed tO
employ such a standard in tandem with a claim grounded on principles of substantive due
process. Compare Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (use of excessive
force during arrest covered exclusively by fourth amendment) with Gilmere v. City of Atlanta,
774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (use excessive force during arrest violates
both fourth amendment and substantive due process), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 , 1124 (1986).
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PERSONAL SECURITY CLAIMS UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]here is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country." 281 Courts, however, have recognized a need to accord
deference to prison administrators 282 when examining a prisoner's 283
personal security claim based on the eighth amendment, 284 which in
part prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." 285 In determining
whether a prisoner has established a constitutional violation under
the eighth amendment, courts have struggled to determine the applicable standard.2ss
In Whitley u. Albers287 the Supreme Court recently discussed the
appropriate standard for establishing a personal security claim under
the eighth amendment when guards injure a prisoner during the
quelling of a prison riot. 288 It afforded broad deference to prison
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that courts should afford broad deference to prison
officials in Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987), as it examined prison regulations concerning
mail and marriage. 107 S. Ct. at 2258. The Court attempted to explain its prior "prisoners'
rights" cases by clearly defining the scope of deference accorded to prison officials. Id at 225962. The Court explained, "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." /d. at 2261.
To determine the reasonableness of the regulation, the Court stated that four factors were
relevant: whether there was a "valid rational connection" between the prison regulation and
the government's asserted legitimate interest; whether prisoners have other ways of exercising
the restricted right; whether accommodation by the prison official would affect guards, other
prisoners, and prison resources; and whether there is an "obvious, easy alternative" available,
signifying that the prison regulation is an "exaggerated response" by prison officials. Id. at
2262; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct 2400, 2404-05 (1987) (adhering to test
articulated in Turner). See generally Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) (deference
to prison officials should not "encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional
claims").
283 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (eighth amendment designed to protect
those individuals convicted of crimes; eighth amendment not applicable to students' claim of
excessive paddling) .
. 284 See, e.g., McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1973) (the Court stated that "there must be mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of
general application").
285 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
288 See, e.g., Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983) (because the eighth
amendment limits the government in various ways, "precedents established in one context do
not always transfer comfortably to another and therefore must be read with the appropriate
distinctions in mind").
287 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
288 See infra notes 34 7-92 and accompanying text.
28 '

282
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officials under the eighth amendment and also found that in this
context protection available under the eighth amendment is coextensive with protection under substantive due process. 289

A.

The Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
"Punishments"

The United States Supreme Court has frequently detailed the
history of the eighth amendment. 290 Pointing out that the reach of
eighth amendment protection extends only to prisoners, 291 the Court
in Ingraham v. Wright292 explained that the amendment limits the
criminal process in three ways: it restricts the kinds of punishment
that legislatures can impose, it "prohibits" punishment that is "grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime," and it limits what acts
a legislature may deem criminal. 293 The Court declared that for the
eighth amendment to be applicable the questioned act must constitute
"punishment." 294 In discussing the use of force in prisons, the Court
stated, "Prison brutality . . . is 'part of the total punishment to which
the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a
proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.' " 295
The Court's statement that "prison brutality" constitutes "punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment indicates that
the Court has interpreted the word "punishment" to denote conduct
See infra notes 353-85 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-76 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.,
concurring).
29 1 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 n.40 (1977).
292 430 u.s. 651 (1977).
293 /d. at 667; Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (the Court observed that "[t]he language of the Eighth
Amendment . . . manifests 'an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminallaw function of government'") (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664); infra notes 360-64 and
accompanying text (discussing eighth amendment standard in Whitley).
294 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 n.39. Pretrial detainees, however, may not be punished prior
to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 (1979). In Bell, the Supreme Court declared that a state's restrictions on the liberty
of pretrial detainees were legitimate and not tantamount to punishment. /d. at 541·43.
295 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976))
(emphasis added); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 n.ll (1981) (quoting same).
The Court also relied on a prior decision in determining that after incarceration only the
" 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.' " 430
U.S. at 670 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); see infra
notes 356-64 and accompanying text (discussing eighth amendment standard in Whitley).
289

290
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not typically classified as punishment. 296 For example, in Estelle u.
Gamble 297 the Court held that a prison guard's deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious medical needs is actionable under the eighth
amendment. 298 The Court implied that a prisoner need not prove an
express intent to inflict pain. 299 Although other courts have stated
that Estelle stands for the proposition that such deliberate indifference
is "cruel and unusual punishment," 300 the Court stated that such
conduct "constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' " 301
In adopting this language as a standard, the Court in Estelle thus
recognized that the eighth amendment may forbid conduct that is
not punishment.ao2
296 Some courts have distinguished between claims arising from an official's decision, made
after reflection, to administer punishment as a penalty for the prisoner's impermissible conduct
and an official's quick decision to administer coercive measures designed to regain control over
the prisoner. See, e.g., Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1987). In Ort, the Eleventh Circuit
observed,
[P]unishment usually is administered to chastise the wrongdoer and to deter him and others
from engaging in such unacceptable conduct in the future. Punishment in this sense is not
designed to bring an ongoing violation to a halt.... Different considerations apply, however,
to an immediate coercive measure undertaken by a prison official, necessitated by a spontaneous violation of a prison rule or regulation.
!d. at 322; Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 494-95 (lOth Cir. 1983) (an unauthorized beating,
even though it does not constitute punishment, falls within the meaning of the eighth amendment).
See generally Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)
(punishment is action "deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose"). Courts
have found that both these claims, those arising from a need to discipline or to punish, are
actionable under the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d at 494-95.
In Glick, Judge Friendly stated that a spontaneous attack, though cruel and unusual, "does not
fit any ordinary concept of 'punishment.' " 481 F.2d at 1032. He determined that substantive
due process protects both pretrial detainees and prisoners from unnecessary force. !d.
297 429 u.s. 97 (1976).
298 !d. at 104. In Ingraham, the dissent cited Estelle for support that the eighth amendment
prohibits more than excessive punishment. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 688 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White stated his belief that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs clearly
is not punishment inflicted for the commission of a crime; it is merely misconduct by a prison
official." !d.
299 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
300 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Sampley, 704 F.2d at 495.
30 1 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Court
first enunciated this phrase as an eighth amendment standard in Gregg v. Georgia as it examined
a state's death penalty statute. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-187. The Court stated that "punishment
must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and it "must not be grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime." !d. at 173.
302 See generally Sainpley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491 (lOth Cir. 1983). The court in Sampley
stated, "Estelle did not require that the guard's acts be authorized or acquiesced in by his
superiors before they can be characterized as punishment. We conclude that under Estelle, a
prison guard's unauthorized beating of an inmate can violate the eighth amendment." !d. at
495 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Estelle emphasized, however, that medical malpractice is not always a constitutional violation. 429 U.S. at 105. The Court explained that,
like substantive due process claims, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care"
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Similarly, in Rhodes u. Chapman, 303 the Court determined that
prison conditions may constitute punishment within the meaning of
the eighth amendment. 304 It declared that the "[c]onditions must not
involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting
imprisonment." 305 The Court recognized that although harsh conditions may properly constitute part of the prisoner's penalty in being
sentenced to prison, 306 conditions that are "cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards" are unconstitutional. 307 The Court explained
that under the eighth amendment "[n]o static 'test' can exist" because
the amendment " 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " 308 The
Court tried to specify how it can make a determination under such
is not" 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" ld. at 105-06 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969)). The Court recognized that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, however,
was inconsistent with "contemporary standards of decency," id. at 103, or with " 'evolving
standards of decency,'" id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth
amendment forbids punishments which are not in line with "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society")).
303 452 u.s. 337 (1981).
304 /d. at 34 7.
305
306

/d.
/d.

307 I d. The Court has also considered the constitutionality of prison conditions for pretrial
detainees under substantive due process. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583-91 (1984);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539-562 (1979). In Bell v. Wolfish, two years before the Court's
decision in Rhodes, the Court stated that under the due process clause the proper test is
"whether [the challenged) conditions amount to punishment of the detainee." Bell, 441 U.S. at
535; see supra note 91. The Court noted that under some circumstances pretrial detainees may
present greater security risks than do convicted prisoners. /d. at 546 n.28. In Block v. Rutherford,
three years after the Court's decision in Rhodes, the Court applied the Bell test in determining
whether pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to contact visits and to observe shakedown
searches of their cells. Block, 468 U.S. at 583-85. Again the Court noted that pretrial detainees
may pose greater security risks than do convicted prisoners. Id. at 587. In both Bell and Block
the Court stated that courts should accord prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell, 441 U.S. at
547 (emphasis added); Block, 468 U.S. at 585 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547); see also Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522-30 (1984) (recognizing importance of institutional security when
considering a fourth amendment challenge to a search and seizure within a prison). In Bell the
Court added that courts should defer to the judgment of prison officials unless an inmate
presents "substantial evidence" that prison officials exaggerated the need to preserve order. Bell,
441 U.S. at 548. The Court also stated that "the operation of our correctional facilities is
peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the
Judicial.'' Id. Therefore, even though prison officials may not punish pretrial detainees prior to
trial, they may nevertheless discipline them because of the need for institutional security. In
addition, prison officials are accorded broad deference in establishing internal security, whether
the inmates are pretrial detainees or are prisoners.
308 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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a "flexible standard." 309 The Court stated that it considers not only
the subjective views of the judges but also other "objective factors." 310
As an example of these latter factors, the Court said that in examining
death penalty statutes it had considered history, state statutes, and
sentences given by juries.311
In determining what constitutes impermissible punishment under
the eighth amendment, the Court has thus looked to societal norms
to ascertain whether the prisoner had suffered "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." The cases indicate that conduct or conditions, though not intentionally designed to punish, may nevertheless
be actionable under the eighth amendment, which prohibits "cruel
and unusual punishments." The Court's recent decision in Whitley
v. Albers312 recognized the history of the eighth amendment, yet raised
many questions, which may affect not only the claims raised by
prisoners, but pretrial detainees as well.
Both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Whitley,
the courts of appeals have applied different standards in examining
a prisoner's personal security claims. 313 One court declared that judges
in setting these standards "walk a precarious path" because they
must not only recognize that prison officials often need to use force
to control a large prison population, but also that prisoners need the
courts to protect them from an abuse of power. 314 In examining these
claims, some courts have failed to mention the amendment forming
the basis of their analyses, 315 and other courts have not distinguished
309 I d. at 345. One commentator has stated that the Rhodes Court was reluctant to use decency
as a distinct standard in evaluating a challenge to prison conditions. Note, Eighth AmendmentA Significant Limit on Federal Court Activism in Ameliorating State Prison Conditions, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1345, 1359 (1981). The commentator found that the Court instead
used as tests the language from Gregg-whether the "conditions involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain" or are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime[s]
warranting imprisonment." Id. at 1345-46. He said that prior to Rhodes, justices that discerned
a separate "decency" standard favored the judiciary's taking a leading role in defining public
values." ld. at 1357 n.100. Other justices, according to the writer, interpreted "evolving standards
of decency" to signify that the "definitions of cruelty and disproportionality may change over
time." ld. at 1357.
310 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
3 11 /d. at 346-4 7.
312 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
313 See infra notes 323-45, 400-27 and accompanying text.
3 14 El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 831 (lOth Cir. 1984).
3 16 See, e.g., Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (court implied an eighth
amendment violation by stating that an unjustified beating of a prisoner by an official constitutes
"cruel and unusual punishment" and that prison officials must comply with "evolving norms
of decency"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); Akili v. Ward, 547 F. Supp. 729, 733-34
(N.D.N.Y. 1982) (court applied the Glick factors and stated that prison officials may use
"reasonable force on prisoners when administering prison regulations").
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eighth amendment claims from substantive due process claims. 316 After
Whitley, the courts have disagreed as to whether a prisoner may
assert a violation of both substantive due process and the eighth
amendment. 317 Central to most of these decisions is Judge Friendly's
decision in Johnson v. Glick.3 1B

B. The Circuits' Evaluation of Personal Security Claims Under the
Eighth Amendment and Substantive Due Process Prior to Whitley

In Johnson v. Glick, 319 Judge Friendly stated that due process affords
protection against official brutality both before and after conviction. 320
Although the plaintiff in Glick was a pretrial detainee rather than a
prisoner, Judge Friendly stated that an attack by a prison official,
though "cruel" and "unusual," does not constitute "punishment."321
He therefore declared that due process must necessarily protect both
pretrial detainees and prisoners. 322
Since Glick, a number of courts have agreed with Judge Friendly's
dictum that prisoners may properly assert a violation of substantive
due process when prison officials use unlawful force. 323 In examining
a prisoner's claim, one court stated that substantive due process, not
the eighth amendment, is the "preferred" basis for analysis. 324 Other
courts, however, have used the Glick factors, whether they were
analyzing a prisoner's claim under substantive due process, 325 or the
See infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 402-27 and accompanying text.
318 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); see infra notes 328-32, 40222, 424 and accompanying text.
319 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
320 !d. at 1032.
321 /d.; see also George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[a]n isolated
assault by an individual guard on an inmate is not, within the meaning of the eighth amendment,
punishment"). But see infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
322 Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032.
323 E.g., Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214
(1983).
324 Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1259 n.3 (6th Cir. 1986). Since the Supreme Court's
decision in Whitley, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the eighth amendment to
a prisoner's unlawful force claim, stating that substantive due process affords a prisoner no
greater protection. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986).
325 E.g., Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1980); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d
481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99-101 (8th Cir.
1986) (court applied Glick factors to a prisoner's claim that a guard had verbally assaulted him).
31 6

31 7
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eighth amendment. 326 Some courts have also applied a variation of
the Glick factors. 327
For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has applied a
variant of the Glick factors to a prisoner's unlawful force claims under
both substantive due process and the eighth amendment. 328 The court
interpreted the Glick factors as imposing "a rather heavy burden"
upon plaintiffs to show that officials used "unreasonable force." 329
Similarly, the Seventh and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
considered factors derived from the Supreme Court's eighth amendment cases and from Johnson v. Glick330 when confronted with personal
security claims arising from the prison setting. The Seventh Circuit
stated that to find violations of substantive due process and the eighth
amendment, a jury must decide that the prison officials "acted under
[the] circumstances in callous and shocking disregard for the [prisoner's] well-being," that the officials' actions "shocked the conscience," or that the "actions were brutal and offensive to human
dignity." 331 The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a district court's recognition
326 See, e.g., Davis v. Lane, 814 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1987); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d
70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1980) (Glick factors aid the court in determining whether there was an
"unjustified striking, beating, or infliction of bodily harm upon a prisoner . . . without just
cause"). Recently, the Fourth Circuit cited the factors used in King as a basic standard for all
claims brought pursuant to section 1983, not just those based on the eighth amendment. See
Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382-83 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
In Meredith u. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first adopted the Glick factors
to determine whether a prisoner had stated a violation of due process. 523 F.2d at 483. The
court recognized that although Judge Friendly articulated the Glick factors when addressing a
pretrial detainee's personal security claim nothing in its prior decisions required it to "adopt
a position less restrictive." !d.
327 See, e.g., Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1214 (1983) (in examining substantive due process claim, court used Glick factors and approved
a jury instruction that provided that officials act unlawfully if they use "greater force than
necessary to accomplish a lawful purpose"); Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 494-96 (lOth
Cir. 1983) (in examining substantive due process and eighth amendment claims court applied
Glick factors, but stated that under the eighth amendment, the challenged conduct must have
also caused "the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); see also infra notes 328-45 and accompanying text.
328 Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 95 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
329 /d. The standard approved by the court provided that a prisoner must show that a guard
"used excessive force, excessive to the degree that a reasonable guard would realize, on the facts
known to him when he did it, that it was excessive." !d. (emphasis added).
In describing the constitutional violation in terms of "unreasonable" conduct, the court did
note that the district court's jury instruction quoted Judge Friendly's admonition that not every
shove, though later deemed unnecessary, is actionable. /d.
330 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
331 Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1151 (7th Cir. 1984). The language used by the court relates
to both substantive due process and eighth amendment cases. The reference to shocking conduct
directly relates to Rochin's "shock the conscience" test; the reference to actions that are brutal
and offensive to human dignity relates to the Rochin Court's finding that the conduct was
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that the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit conduct that is
" 'incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society . . . , or which involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.' " 332
Another court has also added factors to the Glick test but in the
context of considering only an eighth amendment claim. 333 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court's jury instructions,
which specified the Glick factors and also provided that prison officials
may not use force " 'which violates the standards of decency more
or less universally accepted.' " 334 The magistrate had instructed the
jury that the prisoner "had .the right under the eighth amendment
'not to be subjected to unnecessary, unreasonable, and grossly excessive force by prison officials.' " 335 The Third Circuit determined
that these instructions were similar to the plaintiff's proposed instructions, which provided that the officials had violated the eighth
amendment only "if their conduct was 'physically barbarous, shocking
to the conscience, contrary to notions of dignity, humanity, and
decency, or such as to offend sensibilities, shock the conscience or
constitute brutality.' " 336 The court declared that the difference between the given instructions and the requested instructions was "one
of semantics, not substance." 337 The court noted that both the eighth
amendment and substantive due process extend " 'protection from an
brutal and to Justice Brennan's eighth amendment analyses, in which he considered whether
the "punishment comports with human dignity." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)). Other courts have also considered the Glick factors when examining eighth amendment claims. In Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085
(1985), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the use of mace by prison officials
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. ld. at 1269-71. The court did not specify the
Glick factors, but it did consider these elements in the course of its discussion of the eighth
amendment standard. Id. The court found that the officials had not used excessive force in
using the mace, that the mace had caused only temporary discomfort, and that the officers had
acted in good faith. ld. at 1270-71. The court stated that the eighth amendment prohibits "the
infliction of excessive or grossly severe punishment disproportionate to the severity of the offense,
or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or infliction of pain without justification."
ld. at 1269 (emphasis added). The court concluded by finding that the prisoners had failed to
meet their "burden of showing that the [officials] intentionally used exaggerated or excessive
means to maintain discipline and provide the needed S!lCUrity for the institution." ld. at 1271
(emphasis added). The court also recognized that some deference was to be accorded to prison
officials' decisions about maintaining order and discipline. ld.
332
Smith v. Dooley, 591 F. Supp. 1157, 1167 (W.D. La. 1984) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)), aff'd, 778 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1985).
333 Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1131-34 (3d Cir. 1983).
334
Id. at 1132.
33s Jd.
33a I d.
337 Id. at 1134.
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official's abusive exercise of his powers to inflict grossly undue
harm.' "33a
The Tenth Circuit, when considering an eighth amendment claim,
similarly used the Glick factors and stated that the challenged conduct
must have involved the " 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.' " 339 The court explained that "wanton" signifies that the official
intended to harm the prisoner, that "unnecessary" signifies that the
force used was "more than appeared reasonably necessary . . . to
maintain or restore discipline," and that "pain" signifies that the
attack must have caused "either severe pain or a lasting injury." 340
The Tenth Circuit also stated that the standard for substantive
due process claims was similar to the standard it articulated for eighth
amendment claims. 341 It explained that prison officials violate substantive due process when their "attack consists of force intended to
harm the inmate that was greater than appeared reasonably necessary
at the time to maintain or restore discipline and that caused either
severe pain or a lasting injury.'' 342 The court identified, however, two
differences between the analyses343: 1) only intentional conduct is
actionable under the eighth amendment, but that less culpable conduct
may be actionable under substantive due process 344 ; and 2) Parratt
was not applicable to eighth amendment claims, but that it was
unsure if Parratt were applicable to substantive due process claims. 345
These unresolved questions remained open following the Supreme
Court's examination of eighth amendment and substantive due process
claims in Whitley u. Albers. 346
C. Whitley v. Albers: Using Force to Restore Prison Security
In Whitley u. Albers347 prisoner Albers alleged that prison officials
had violated his right to personal security under the eighth and
!d. at 1133 (quoting Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979)).
Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 (lOth Cir. 1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
u.s. 153, 173 (1976)).
:wo !d.
.
341 /d. at 495 n.6. See generally Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(stating that Glick factors are relevant to the general inquiry for all excessive force claims,
regardless of the amendment asserted).
342 Sampley, 704 F.2d at 495 n.6.
343 /d.
344 /d.
345 /d. at 495-96 n.6
346 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
347 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
338
339
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fourteenth amendments. 348 Albers generally alleged that during a
prison disturbance, in which prison officials attempted to free a
hostage, a prison official deliberately shot Albers in the leg as he ran
up the stairs to his cell. 349 Albers alleged that after the prisoners
released the hostage, prison officials dragged Albers by the hair down
some stairs, while allowing him to bleed profusely for ten to fifteen
minutes. 350 He also alleged that as he lay on the floor an officer
shoved the barrel of a gun into his face. 351 The majority opinion,
however, considered only the constitutionality of the shooting. 352
The Court discussed its prior eighth amendment decisions and the
Glick factors. 353 The Court reiterated that "'only the "'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' " . . . constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.' " 354 It described this phrase as a "general requirement
that an Eighth Amendment claimant [must] allege and prove.'' 355
The Court explained that in challenging "conduct that does not
purport to be punishment at all," a prisoner must prove more than
a lack of ordinary care. 356 It recognized that under the eighth amendment prisoners may challenge different kinds of conduct-decisions
regarding conditions of confinement, medical care, or restoration of
control over "a tumultuous cellblock.'' 357 The Court explained, that
regardless of the kind of challenged conduct, "obduracy and wantonness ... characterize the conduct prohibited by [the eighth amendment].''358 It emphasized, however, that in considering the general
requirement that prisoners allege and prove "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain," courts should consider the "kind of conduct" the
prisoner is challenging. 359
Although the Court stated that obduracy and wantonness characterize all valid eighth amendment claims, it stated that a "standard"
348

I d. at 317.

Id. at 314-16. Whitley, the prison's security manager, stated that he had formed his assault
team to end the disturbance after talking to the prison superintendent and the assistant
superintendent and after determining that tear gas was an unworkable alternative. Id. at 31516. He claimed that the plan was formed to protect not only the safety of the hostage, but
also the safety of the inmates who were not rioting. Id. at 316.
350 Id. at 332 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349

/d.
/d. at 314-28.
353 /d. at 318-22.
354 /d. at 319 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977), which quoted Estelle

351

352

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)); see supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
355 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
358 /d. at 319.
/d.
/d.
359 /d. at 320.

357

358
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applied to some conduct forbidden under the eighth amendment is
not necessarily applicable to other eighth amendment claims. 360 Analyzing the conduct challenged in Whitley, the Court stated that it
involved "a prison security measure . . . undertaken to resolve a
disturbance ... that indisputably pose[d] significant risks to the
safety of inmates and prison staff. " 361 The Court then explained that
determining whether the prison security measure inflicted unnecessary
and wanton pain and suffering "ultimately turns on" 362 the final factor
mentioned in Glick-" 'whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.' " 363 The Court set this factor
as the one determining the "general requirement" of eighth amendment claims, even though it previously stated that the eighth amendment does not require "[a]n express intent to inflict unnecessary
pain."364
To determine whether prison officials had acted maliciously, the
Court stated that the other Glick factors are relevant-the need for
the force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force,
and the extent of the injury inflicted. 365 These remaining factors, the
Court explained, create inferences relating to the question of malice
and sadism. 366 The Court, however, classified the inferences into two
categories: those that evince wantonness and those that indicate that
the "use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary.'' 367
In addition to using the remaining three Glick factors to determine
malice or sadism, the Court articulated two other factors and emphasized the judiciary's role in examining such claims. The Court
stated that courts should examine the danger to staff and inmates,
as perceived by prison officials, and should consider whether the
officials made any effort "to temper the severity of a forceful response.''368 In addition to considering the five specified factors, the
360 /d. To illustrate, the Court cited Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which held that
the eighth amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.
/d.; see also supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. In examining Albers' claim, the Court
stated that a standard of "deliberate indifference" would not properly recognize competing
interests. /d. The Court explained that such a standard would fail to consider the prison officials'
need to protect the prison staff, administrative personnel, visitors, and the inmates. /d.
36 1 /d. at 320-21.
362 /d.
363 /d. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973)).
3B< /d. at 319-20.
365 /d. at 321.
366 /d.
367 I d. (emphasis added).
366 /d.
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Court stated, " 'Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security.' " 369 Relying on
its prior decision discussing pretrial detainees' substantive due process
rights, the Court stated that the eighth amendment provides a remedy
for prisoners for actions taken in bad faith or without a legitimate
purpose.37o
After articulating its five-factor test and the appropriate level of
deference, the Court proceeded to analyze the facts to determine
whether they could support a reliable inference of wantonness. 371 The
Court found that the prison officials had not acted wantonly. 372 Albers'
experts had testified that prison officials were possibly hasty in their
decision to use firearms and could have considered using other means
to release the hostage. 373 The Court explained, however, that a mere
error in judgment does not establish a constitutional violation. 374 It
stated, "[This evidence] falls far short of a showing that there was
no plausible basis for the officials' belief that this degree of force was
necessary" or that the belief was "wholly unreasonable."375
The Court also did not find wanton the prison official's order to
shoot low at inmates running up the stairs, nor the failure to provide
a verbal warning before shooting. 376 The Court determined that Albers
!d. at 321-22 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (emphasis added)).
/d. at 322; see supra notes 91 & 302.
371
/d. at 322-26. Even though the Court had stated earlier that to prove an eighth amendment
violation Albers would have to prove that the prison officials acted maliciously or sadistically,
the Court analyzed the facts by questioning whether the prison officials' conduct was wanton.
!d. at 322. The Court, however, related wantonness to an intent to punish, stating that inferring
wantonness "is tantamount to [finding] a knowing willingness that [the unjustified intrusion]
occur." !d. at 321. The Court cited as support three cases. In Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
equated "deliberate indifference" under the eighth amendment with the criminal law definition
of "recklessness," which is "an act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk can
be inferred". 780 F.2d at 652. In both Block v. Rutherford and Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme
Court stated that pretrial detainees may prove a violation of due process by establishing that
prison officials intended to punish them. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). The Court stated that courts may infer an inte'nt to
punish by finding that the challenged conduct was not "reasonably related to a legitimate goal."
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539; see Block, 468 U.S. at 584; see also supra notes 362-69 and accompanying
text.
372 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322-26.
373
/d. at 323.
369
37o

374
375

/d.
/d. (emphasis added).

376
!d. at 324. The Court commented that the officials had no way of knowing which prisoners
were aiding Klenk and those that were not. !d. It also found meritorious the prison officials
argument that a verbal warning could have thwarted their efforts to recover the hostage. !d.
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had failed to meet his "extremely heavy" burden in proving that the
actual shooting was wanton. 377 The Court declared that even if an
officer had intended to shoot Albers rather than shoot at the entire
group of inmates, the officer, who had only a few seconds to react
to the prisoners' activity, nevertheless had "some basis for believing
that [Albers] constituted a threat to the hostage."378
After determining that the various actions were not wanton, the
Court concluded with the only sentence discussing the primary Glick
factor. It stated, "Under these circumstances, the actual shooting was
part and parcel of a good-faith effort to restore prison security." 379
The Court therefore held that the prison officials had not violated
the eighth amendment.3so
As an alternative ground, the Court briefly discussed Albers' substantive due process claim and its relation to his eighth amendment
claim. The Court stated that when prisoners assert the use of excessive
and unjustified force, their "primary source of substantive protection"
is the eighth amendment. 381 The Court stated that "conduct that
'shocks the conscience' or 'afford[s] brutality the cloak of law,'" in
violation of substantive due process, 382 would also be "'inconsistent
with contemporary standards of decency' and 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' " in violation of the eighth amendment. 383 The
Court therefore determined that when Albers failed to prove that
"prison security measures" violated the eighth amendment, he failed
to prove that the measures violated substantive due process because
the due process clause does not afford more protection than does the
eighth amendment. 384 The Court explicitly left open, however, whether
the due process clause affords the same scope of protection to pretrial
detainees and those individuals enjoying unrestricted liberty "outside
the prison security context."385
Justice Marshall, joined by three other justices, dissented to the
Court's eighth amendment analysis and rejected the Court's view of
the protection afforded by substantive due process. 386 First, Justice
/d. at 325.
/d. at 325-26. The Court stated that Albers' movement towards the stairs was equivocal
conduct; in the Court's view, if he wanted to be safe Albers could have thrown himself on the
floor. /d. at 325.
379 I d. at 326.
380 /d.
381 /d. at 327. It did not, however, explain what it meant by "primary source."
382 /d. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 173 (1952)).
383 /d. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 106 (1976)).
384 /d.
385 /d.
386 /d. at 328-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined
in the dissenting opinion, id at 328; except that Justice Stevens did not join Justice Marshall's
discussion of substantive due process, id. at 334 n.2.
377

378

1987]

Personal Security Claims

225

Marshall contended that even though a prisoner does bear a heavy
burden in establishing an eighth amendment violation, the Court's
eighth amendment standard was too onerous. 387 In analyzing the
Court's malice or sadism standard, the dissent emphasized that the
Court improperly used a single Glick factor, rather than all of them,
to determine whether there was a constitutional violation. 388 The
dissent stated that the clear eighth amendment standard was whether
the challenged conduct was "unnecessary and wanton," and not
whether it was expressly intended to inflict harm. 389
Second, the dissent disagreed with the Court's conclusion that
substantive due process affords Albers the same protection as does
the eighth amendment. 390 As support for the proposition that the
protection is not coextensive, the dissent cited Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Davidson v. Cannon, 391 in which he stated that under some
circumstances negligent conduct may constitute a violation of substantive due process.392
After the Court's decision in Whitley, the scope of protection
afforded under the eighth amendment and substantive due process is
unclear. Although the majority opinion specifically left open the
question of the scope of protection afforded pretrial detainees under
substantive due process, it did not clearly specify the scope of protection available under the eighth amendment. Both the majority and
the dissent agreed that under the eighth amendment the relevant
issue is whether the challenged conduct inflicted "unnecessary and
wanton pain." 393 The majority, however, rephrased this "general requirement"394 as one signifying that the official acted maliciously and
387 !d. at 328-30. In the alternative, the dissent argued that even if the Court's standard were .
proper, the Court failed to interpret the facts properly. !d. at 330-34. In the dissent's view, the
Court failed to remember that Albers claimed that officers dragged him down the stairs by the
hair, let him bleed for a long time and shoved a gun into his face. !d. at 332-33. Those facts,
the dissent maintained, indicate that the jury should have determined whether the conduct was
unnecessary and wanton. !d. at 333-34.
388 I d. at 329 n.l.
389
Id. at 328-29. The dissent emphasized that even though the Court stated that the eighth
amendment does not require an intent to inflict harm the Court's announced standard nevertheless
required Albers to prove an express intent to inflict harm. Id. The dissent argued that the
Court's test allows a judge to impose this heightened standard after making two preliminary
findings of fact: there was a "disturbance" and the disturbance posed "significant risks to the
safety of inmates and prison staff." Id. at 329. He maintained that juries, not judges, should
make these findings. Id. at 329-30.
390 !d. at 334 n.2.
39
' 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
392 /d. at 350; see supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text~
a9a 475 U.S. at 320, 328.
394 /d. at 320.
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sadistically. 395 The majority, however, did not apply this specific
standard, but rather questioned whether the conduct was wanton and
unnecessary. 396
In determining whether the conduct was impermissible, the majority
in Whitley frequently noted that the case involved "prison security
measures." 397 After reiterating the broad deference accorded prison
officials under the due process clause and in this eighth amendment
case, the majority concluded by stating that its holding does not
determine the rights of other individuals "outside the prison security
context. " 398
Thus, the majority opinion does not clearly indicate whether its
heightened standard applies only to cases involving prison riots or if
it also applies to cases involving general prison discipline. If by "prison
security context" th,e majority meant to signify action taken by prison
officials to maintain order in the prison, then lower courts may need
to re-evaluate their prior decisions discussing the protection available
to prisoners under the eighth amendment and substantive due process.

D.

The Circuits' Evaluation of Personal Security Claims Under the
Eighth Amendment and Substantive Due Process after Whitley

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Whitley v. Albers, 399 the lack
of unity in examining prisoners' personal security claims has continued. Most courts have quoted Whitley's formulation of the eighth
amendment standard, but have emphasized different aspects of it. 400
In addition, the federal courts have not agreed as to whether, after
Whitley, prisoners may concomitantly assert personal security claims
under both the eighth amendment and substantive due process. 401
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the Court's decision
in Whitley when it evaluated a prisoner's claim that prison officials
had failed to protect him from other inmates402 ; it did not, however,
refer to Whitley when examining the prisoner's second claim, that
Id. at 320· 21.
/d. at 322; see supra notes 372-78 and accompanying text.
397 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. The majority stated that the officials were trying to restore
"official control over a tumultuous cellblock," id. at 319, that the officials were faced with a
"prison disturbance," id. at 320, and that the officials' actions involved "prison security," id.
398 I d. at 329.
399
475 U.S. 312 (1986); see supra notes 347-98 and accompanying text.
' 00 See infra notes 402-27 and accompanying text.
395
396

401

/d.

' 02

Johnson v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the prison officials themselves had unlawfully beat him. In considering
the latter claim, the court implied that it was considering the eighth
amendment by stating that prison officials can incur liability when
their "abuse of power inflicts cruel and unusual punishment." 403 The
court applied the Glick factors and found that the force was "grossly
disproportionate to the need [for force]" and that the officials were
not merely careless or overly zealous. 404
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, like many circuits, has
extensively quoted the Whitley opinion when articulating the appropriate eighth amendment standard for personal security claims. 405 It
applied the three Glick factors mentioned in Whitley4 06 for determining
whether the security measure " 'inflicted unnecessary and wanton
pain and suffering.' " 407 It noted that this issue "turns upon" the final
Glick factor-whether the force was applied maliciously and sadistically. 408 It did not, however, mention the fourth and fifth factors
mentioned in Whitley, whether the officials considered the safety of
the staff and inmates, and whether they made any effort to temper
a forceful response. 409 The court determined that the officials needed
to use force and that the prisoner suffered a minor injury. 41° From
these two factors the court decided the third factor 411 and found that
the amount of force involved a "mere dispute" about the reasonableness of the force. 412 The court concluded that these three factors,
in light of the deference it must show prison officials, indicated that
the evidence did not support" 'a reliable inference of wantonness.' " 413
The court also rejected the prisoner's substantive due process claim. 414
It found that the Court's decision in Whitley "established that the
Due Process Clause affords a convicted prisoner no greater protection
than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause" of the eighth
!d. at 1257.
!d. (citing Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981).
405 Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188-1189 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The prisoner in
Brown alleged that guards had used unlawful force when he refused to comply with their
command to return to his cell. !d. at 1189. In examining this claim, the court stated that the
actions by the officials implicated "institutional security interests." !d. at 1189 n.2; see also id.
at 1189 n.3. The court concluded that because Whitley also involved security interests, it should
accord prison officials broad deference. !d. at 1189 n.2.
406 !d. at 1188-89.
4°7 !d. at 1188 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1985).
408 !d.
409 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
410 Brown, 813 F.2d at 1189.
411 !d.
412 !d.
41 3 !d. at 1189-90 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322).
414 !d. at 1188.
40 3
404
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amendment. 415
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly interpreted Whitley
and found that the eighth and fourteenth amendments afford a
prisoner coextensive protection. 416 In articulating the eighth amendment standard, the court stated that the challenged conduct must
have been both "unnecessary and wanton." 417 The court agreed with
the Whitley Court's statement of this standard, but it did not find
that this issue "ultimately turns on" or "turns upon" whether the
action was committed maliciously or sadistically. 418 The court explicitly
rejected requiring proof of "malicious intent." 419 It stated that malicious intent is not "an indispensable element" of an eighth amendment claim. 420 "[R]eason or motivation for the conduct," the court
observed, is only a single factor used to determine the issue of
wantonness. 421 The court indicated that the other relevant factors
were those specified in Glick and the element of deference to be
afforded to prison officials. 422
In contrast to the interpretations of Whitley by the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' view that
Whitley does not bar a prisoner from raising both an eighth amendment claim and a substantive due process claim. 423 In examining these
two types of claims, the court used the Glick factors when addressing
the substantive due process claim424 ; but when evaluating the eighth
amendment claim, the court relied on portions of the Supreme Court's
decision in Whitley, 426 and examined the guard's use of force to
mJd.

Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986). In Parrish, a paraplegic prisoner
alleged that a guard forced him to sit in his own feces, assaulted him with a knife, extorted
food from him, and verbally abused him. !d. at 605. The court examined these allegations in
light of the Court's decision in Whitley. !d. Although this case does not involve the common
allegation that a prison official beat a prisoner, the alleged actions nonetheless describe a personal
security claim because of the prisoner's medical condition. The court in Parrish analyzed the
claim under the eighth amendment, even though in a decision before Whitley the court had
noted that most courts prefer analyzing these claims under substantive due process, not the
eighth amendment. Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1259 n.3 (6th Cir. 1986).
m Parrish, 800 F.2d at 604.
m !d. at 605.
416

/d.
/d.
421 /d.
422 /d. at 604-05.
419
420

McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784-86 (9th Cir. 1986). A dissenting judge warned the
court that Whitley indicates that the protection available under the eighth amendment and
substantive due process is coextensive. !d. at 787 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). In McRorie, a prisoner alleged that a guard rammed a riot stick up his anus after he
involuntarily giggled during a strip search. !d. at 781-82.
424 /d. at 785.
425 /d. at 784.
423
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determine if the guard "could not plausibly have thought [it] necessary."426 The court also explained that a prison official acts wantonly
within the meaning of the eighth amendment when "'the unjustified
infliction of harm . . . is tantamount to a knowing willingness that
it occur.' " 427
The courts of appeals, before and after Whitley, have not applied
a single standard when addressing prisoners' personal security claims,
whether based on substantive due process or the eighth amendment.
The courts have also displayed this lack of unity when analyzing
personal security claims based on violations of substantive due process
and the fourth amendment. Although personal security claims may
arise under different amendments, courts could gain a better understanding of these claims by considering the methods they use to
examine unlawful force claims.

IV.

STRIKING THE BALANCE UNDER THE FOURTH, EIGHTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

In examining unlawful force claims, most courts have balanced the
interests of the parties without discussing how the alleged applicable
amendment or amendments could affect the balance. They have
applied the factors Judge Friendly articulated in Johnson v. Glick428
to substantive due process claims. Guided by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Daniels v. Williams, 429 Davidson v.
Cannon,4ao Tennessee v. Garner,431 and Whitley v. Albers,432 courts
have also addressed violations of personal security under the fourth
and eighth amendments. Yet when assessing personal security claims
based on the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, courts have
not uniformly resolved the following two issues: whether a plaintiff
must prove that officials acted maliciously, in accordance with the
final Glick factor, and whether substantive due process duplicates the
protection available under the fourth and eighth amendments. In the
future when courts confront these issues, they should determine that
plaintiffs need not prove malice to establish a violation of personal
/d.
/d. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
428 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
429 474 u.s. 327 (1986).
430 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
431 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
432 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
426
427
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security and that substantive due process does not always duplicate
the protection provided by the fourth and eighth amendments.
A.

The Requirement of Malice for Personal Security Claims

Courts have properly discerned that the first three Glick factorsthe need for force, the relationship between the need and the amount
of force used, and the extent of the injury-provide an initial framework of analysis for all personal security claims, regardless of the
amendment upon which the claim is based. These factors compel
courts to balance the parties' interests as they resolve the fundamental
inquiry of all unlawful force claims-whether the force employed by
a state officer was unjustified. In addition to these three factors, some
courts, however, have erroneously required plaintiffs to prove that
officials acted maliciously, without regard to the amendment upon
which they seek protection. 433
Judge Friendly, in Johnson v. Glick, 434 specified four factors that
have aided courts in interpreting the Supreme Court's "shocks the
conscience" test for substantive due process claims. 435 Nowhere in his
opinion, however, did Judge Friendly indicate that the fourth factor,
a showing of malice, is necessary to establish all personal security
claims.
In addition, the Supreme Court has never rendered a decision
making malice an indispensable element of all such claims. Although
the Supreme Court ruled in Daniels v. Williams 436 and Davidson v.
Cannon 437 that negligent conduct did not violate substantive due
process, 438 the Court specifically left open the question whether gross
negligence or recklessness could constitute a deprivation of substantive
due process. 439 The Court recognized that the due process clause
affords individuals protection against " 'the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government.' " 440 Because reckless or grossly negligent conduct signifies that the party employing the force should have been
433 See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane). But see Lester v. City
of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying a personal security analysis without
the factor of malice).
434 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
435
/d. at 1033.
436
474 u.s. 327 (1986).
437 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
438 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-36.
439 Id. at 334 n.3.
440 /d. at 331 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
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aware of the obvious risk of harm, courts should deem that this type
of arbitrary, careless use of force by officials constitutes an abuse of
power within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 441 This form
of analysis will preserve the aim of the first three Glick factors in
preventing the official exercise of unlawful force, while relieving the
plaintiff of the stringent requirement of proving malice.
Similarly, in considering personal security claims based on the
eighth amendment, courts should recognize that the Supreme Court
in Whitley v. Albers442 focused on whether the conduct was wanton,
despite its assertion that the "test" was whether the conduct was
malicious. 443 To determine whether the use of force during a prison
riot violated the eighth amendment and substantive due process, the
Court relied on the first three Glick factors as well as the threat to
safety and the efforts made to temper a forceful response by the
prisoners. 444 Although the Court used these factors to determine if
the officials had acted maliciously, the Court fused its definition of
"malice" with its definition of "wantonness," stating that wanton
conduct is "tantamount to a knowing willingness that [the harm]
occur." 445 By defining wanton conduct in this way, the Court did not
require actual knowledge of the harm, that is, malice, but instead
indicated that in some cases knowledge might be imputed to the
official. The Court, therefore, impliedly found wanton conduct to be
synonymous with reckless conduct because both signify that the
ensuing harm is obvious, even if not known.
If courts do interpret Whitley as requiring actual malice, they should
nevertheless recognize that the standard the Court set forth related
to a unique context, a prison riot. The Court properly noted in
Whitley that although a prisoner must generally allege that the official
inflicted "unnecessary and wanton pain" to establish a violation of
the eighth amendment, not all eighth amendment claims require the
same level of culpability. 446 While it may be appropriate to require a
See supra note 183. Courts have struggled, however, to distinguish between gross negligence
and recklessness. See, e.g., Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987)
(person acts grossly negligent if she "intentionally does something unreasonable with disregard
to a known risk or a risk so obvious that [she] must be assumed to have been aware of it,
and of a magnitude such that it is highly probable that harm will follow"). They have also had
difficulty in distinguishing between recklessness and negligence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 743
F.2d 342, 350 (6th Cir. 1984) (court found an officer negligent for having his pistol cocked
while trying to handcuff a suspect, stating that this action indicated a "reckless disregard for
the rights of the suspect"), uacated, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
442 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
443 /d. at 322.
444 Id. at 320-22 i.
44 5 /d. at 321 (emphasis added).
446 ld. at 320-21.
441
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prisoner to prove malice for a claim arising from the use of force
during a prison riot, such a strict standard would not be necessary
absent the heightened exigencies of a riot. When interpreting eighth
amendment personal security claims, courts should not hesitate to
distinguish between those cases involving the state's substantial interest in maintaining prison order, as found in Whitley, and those
cases devoid of this compelling state interest, cases which should only
require a prisoner to prove the infliction of "unnecessary and wanton
pain."
In resolving excessive force claims based on the fourth amendment,
some courts have also erroneously required a showing of malice. 447
By doing so, these courts have failed to properly interpret the Supreme
Court's decision in Tennessee u. Garner. 448 In Garner, the Court
analyzed the force used to effectuate a seizure under the fourth
amendment, an amendment traditionally requiring courts to balance
the interests of the parties. 449 The Garner Court declared that the
fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement applies not only to
when an officer may seize a suspect, but also as to how the officer
may seize her. 450 The Court stated that to determine whether an
officer used reasonable means to seize a suspect, a court should
"'balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion.' " 451 The analysis in
Garner thus included only the first three Glick factors: it considered
the need for the force used, the relationship between the amount of
force and the need for it, and the extent of injury. A personal security
claim based on the fourth amendment, like other fourth amendment
claims, 452 necessarily requires a court to consider whether the official's
conduct was objectively reasonable. Courts that also require a plaintiff
to prove malice, the fourth Glick factor, fail to recognize the objective
See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane); Graham v. City of
Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987).
448 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
••• I d. at 8.
' 50 Id. (citing U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968));
see also Aleinikoff, supra note 222, at 965 (and cases cited therein). Professor Aleinikoff noted
that the Supreme Court has balanced competing interests in the following fourth amendment
areas:
the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the definition of a search, the reasonableness of a
search, the reasonableness of a seizure, the meaning of probable cause, the level of suspicion
required to support stops and detentions, the scope of the exclusionary rule, the necessity
of obtaining a warrant, and the legality of pretrial detention of juveniles.
ld. (emphasis added).
' 51 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
<52 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (exclusionary rule).
447
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standard of reasonableness mandated by Garner's interpretation of
the fourth amendment.
Although a showing of malice will invariably enhance the credibility
of a claim, such a showing should not be set up as a prerequisite for
all personal security claims based on the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments. Because the fourth amendment standard is one of
objective reasonableness, an official's state of mind only affects the
determination of liability under claims based on the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Identifying the constitutional basis for each
type of excessive force claim should thus aid courts in selecting the
appropriate standard of liability.

B. The Relationship of Substantive Due Process to Personal
Security Claims Based on the Fourth and Eighth Amendments

To determine the scope of protection available to a plaintiff for a
violation of personal security, courts should first seek to identify the
interests protected by each amendment. For example, the Supreme
Court recognized that both the eighth and fourteenth amendments
protect the personal security of prisoners, 453 that the fourteenth
amendment protects pretrial detainees, 454 and that the fourth amendment serves to protect individuals from unreasonable seizures. 455 This
simple statement of coverage by the amendments, however, fails to
explain how these separate constitutional guarantees may work together to protect against instances of official use of excessive force. 456
When a court is presented with a claim which can be disposed of
under either a fourth or eighth amendment standard, there is no
m See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); see also supra notes 147-56, 165-81
and accompanying text (discussing the Daniels and Davidson opinions).
464 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see also supra note 91 (discussing substantive
due process issue in Bell v. Wolfish).
4
~~ Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
456 The lack of an explanation has led to a divergence of views among the federal circuit
courts of appeals on the interplay of the fourteenth amendment with the fourth and eighth
amendments. Compare Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(allowing plaintiff to bring separate claims based on the fourth and fourteenth amendments),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986) with Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.
1987) (plaintiff limited to single claim based on objective reasonableness standard of the fourth
amendment). Compare McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (permitting prisoner
to raise both eighth amendment and substantive due process claims for personal security) with
Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejecting attempt by prisoner to raise substantive
due process in addition to eighth amendment claim).
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reason for the court to employ a more stringent substantive due
process analysis because a plaintiff may not be allowed to recover
twice for one type of harm. 457 Substantive due process becomes a
viable alternative, however, when courts decide that the fourth amendment is not applicable because the plaintiff was not technically
"seized" within the terms of that amendment. Thus, if the claim
alleges the use of excessive force occurred after the technical arrest,
but while the plaintiff was still in the custody of the arresting officer, 458
or if the court refuses to find that the plaintiff was "seized" when
police set up a roadblock that resulted in physical injury, 459 substantive
due process should remain as an available source of protection for
the plaintiff.
The complex interrelationships among the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments have given rise to the difficult questions concerning the proper place of malice and substantive due process doctrine
in analyzing the official use of unlawful force. Although these specific
questions are perhaps the most visible throughout the caselaw, they
are but representative of the myriad difficulties in arriving at an
enlightened and constitutionally consistent handling of all personal
security claims.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (employing a substantive
due process analysis to the use of force while the plaintiff was still in the custody of the
arresting officer). Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit in Justice has apparently chosen to deny
plaintiffs, who are injured by the use of excessive force while still in the custody of an arresting
officer, the advantageous protection of the fourth amendment's objective reasonableness standard.
The result is unfortunate because it restrictively construes the type of activity which constitutes
a fourth amendment "seizure," and cuts against the Supreme Court's own recognition that
pretrial detainees do not lose their fourth amendment rights. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (fourth amendment protects robbery suspect from an unreasonable search for evidence
which would have entailed the surgical removal of a bullet from his body). Indeed, as the dissent
in Justice noted, it would be peculiar to find that individuals are "seized" when police officers
briefly stop them on the street, but not when they are physically injured immediately after
they are arrested. Justice, 834 F.2d at 388 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Courts in the future should
construe the term "seizure" broadly enough to afford protection to those plaintiffs injured by
the use of excessive force while still in the custody of an arresting officer.
459 See Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1987) (No. 87-248) (holding that a police roadblock does not
constitute a "seizure" under the fourth amendment). Contrary to the holding in Brower, courts
should apply a fourth amendment standard, not a substantive due process standard, to claims
based on injuries resulting from a police roadblock. In pursuing this analysis, courts should
recognize that a roadblock accomplishing its task by causing injury effects a fourth amendment
seizure similar to the seizure at issue in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). The fleeing
driver of an automobile, like the fleeing burglary suspect in Garner, should be given the level
of protection afforded by the fourth amendment's objective standard.
457

458
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CONCLUSION

In examining claims that a state official used unlawful force, courts
have disagreed as to the scope of protection available under substantive
due process, the fourth amendment, and the eighth amendment. Courts
have applied different standards in addressing these personal security
claims. Courts have also disagreed as to whether substantive due
process is an appropriate ground for recovery, and if so, whether the
protection available under substantive due process duplicates the
protection available under the fourth and eighth amendments.
In addressing these claims, courts should recognize the balancing
process inherent in all unlawful force claims. Judge Friendly recognized this process by indicating that the following factors are relevant
to determining whether a plaintiff has established a violation of
personal security: the need for the force, the relationship between
the need for the force and the amount of force used, the extent of
the injury inflicted, and the official's motives for using the force.
Courts have generally applied the first three factors, or their functional
equivalents, in examining all personal security claims; yet, the courts'
application of the final factor of malice has been less clear.
To establish consistency in addressing personal security claims,
courts should recognize that the fundamental inquiry when a personal
security claim is asserted is simply whether the force was unjustified.
This inquiry entails consideration of the applicable amendment, because the amendment can aid courts in identifying the proper standard
for liability. By giving due consideration to the specific interests
protected by an amendment, courts can better strive for consistency
in discerning whether an official violated an individual's constitutional
right to personal security.

